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CHAPTER

I

INTRODUCTION

special perspicacity is not necessary to be able
in examining normal adult individuals who'are representative of the honest, human average,
the truly
logical pel sons who are masters of their reasoning
power
are as rare as are the truly moral men who exercise
their
conscience with all their strength.
•

.

.

to grasp that,

Jean Piaget

1

Wiile it is apparent that virtue must be learned, it is not
as clear that it can be taught.

one that must remain open.

Strictly speaking, the question is

We cannot demonstrate that such a thing

has ever been done, yet neither can we be certain that it has not.
We can, however, establish the theoretical possibility of teaching

virtue.

The aim of this paper is to reaffirm such

a

theory, and to

support it in a practical way by presenting a complementary theory

of learning from which we may conclude that the teaching of virtue
is a psychological possibility as well as a philosophical one.
~>

Plato has provided the logical framework

the argument we

need is of this form:
1.

Virtue is knowledge of the Good.

2.

Knowledge can be taught.

3.

Virtue can be tauglit.

That Plato apparently came to modify

-

one might say compromise

-

his position on the first proposition may have been due to growing
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doubt about the truth of the second.

Teaching, as it is usually

understood, implies submission by the learner
to the instruction or

example of the teacher and the acquisition of
new opinions or skills.
But we can gain knowledge only by submitting
to reason, and reason-

ing appears to be a wholly independent activity.

We may conclude

either that knowledge cannot be taught or that there
is another
sense in which to understand "teaching”

our reason.

In the Meno

-

one that asks us to use

it seems that we are being encouraged to

,

draw the second conclusion, hence to appreciate the soundness
of the

Socratic method.

That no (other) teacher of virtue can be found is

no proof that one might not exist.

Although he himself has called it into question, Plato continues to favor the opinion (which seems to me correct) that what
can be learned can be taught, provided
used.

tlie

appropriate method is

Indeed, without such an idea there could be no Utopian scheme

like that of the Republic

.

But we find there that the second prem-

ise of our argument is qualified in such a way that it might now

read,

"knowledge can be taught sometimes."

This suggests, not that

Plato is disillusioned about the effectiveness of the method, but
that he has either given up believing or else never believed in the

universal existence of reason adequate to profit from such teaching.
If knowledge can be taught only sometimes, it is because it can only

sometimes be learned.

Having identified the correct means of teaching knowledge,
and apparently having found little improvement in virtue, Plato could
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hardly avoid such

a

conclusion.

That a person capable of reason

would willingly fail to use it must have been
inconceivable to
someone who presumed that no one who knew what was
right could do
otherwise.

And if Plato himself did not allow enough time
for the
t

method to prove itself, or if because of lack of acceptance
he had
no such opportunity, similar methods have been tried
since and there
IS ample evidence that

ignorance persists, supporting the opinion

that many of us are not able to reason.

The alternative is to liold

that we know innately, or have all somehow managed to learn, how to

recognize the Good, but that we persist in doing wrong deliberately.
Even if this statement is not already a logical contradiction, most

of us would simply deny that human nature is so perverse.

We would

rather admit to ignorance than vice.
Yet if we hold any hope for the possibility of a more just

society,

it must be based on the belief that we are educable in one

way or another.

Rather than relinquish that idea, Plato abandoned

the provisional definition of virtue as knowledge proposed in the

Meno and conceived instead a system of justice based on the notion
7

of a tripartite soul.

Now virtue became a question of knowledge

only for those in whom reason was predominant, and who would be

charged with making judgments on behalf of the whole society.

For

the rest, whose social virtue consisted in carrying out their proper roles as providers or defenders, true belief would have to suf-

fice as a guide to right conduct.

In all

cases, personal virtue

still required that the "appetitive" and "spirited" parts of the
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soul be controlled by the rational.

Revised, our argument is this:
1.

Virtue is either knowledge or true belief.

2.

True belief, and in some cases knowledge,
can be taught.

3.

Virtue can be taught.

For the most part, this is the basis on which
we actually operate,

with a heavy reliance on belief.

But the trouble with belief, as

Plato was acutely aware, is its transitory nature.

Idiat

is

learned

by indoctrination can be as easily forgotten, and
replaced or even

accompanied by

a

contradictory idea.

On the other hand, beliefs

times difficult to dislodge.

tliat

ought to be revised are some-

In order to be transferred in a prac-

tical way, rules of conduct must be plirased in such particular terms

that they will demand revision under changing conditions.

But those

accustomed to depending upon the judgments of others, still influenced by old threats or pj’omises, will not be changed by new evidence
or argument.

nated in

a

Yet neither is it likely that they can be reindoctri-

uniform way, for there will surely be discrepancies even

among the justifiable interpretations of

a

given principle.

Indoc-

trination may be suited to a small and relatively stable group, loyal
to a consistently wise and benevolent ruler

nized as such).

(if one could be recog-

But where there is neither such a situation nor the

mediation of reason, the breadth of opinion we encourage seems to
result less in informed growth than in the multiplication of tensions
and animosities, in the course of which the initial significance of
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our beliefs is lost.
Beliefs, when provisional, are an
essential step in under-

standing; fixed, they are often pernicious.

One response to this

problem is to bypass thought altogether, and
to concern ourselves
only with behavior.

To do so, however, is to encounter the
choice

between anarchy and manipulation.

We can leave virtue to instinct

and chance, or else define it as conformity
and attempt to influence behavior directly by means of rewards and
punishments.

The

latter, if only from a practical standpoint, is a step
backward

rather than forward.

Because only very specific habits can be

formed in this way, the non-thinking individual is helpless in
the
face of change and requires constant direction and supervision.

And

again, even if we had efficient technical means of accomplishing

such training

-

by electronic devices, for example

-

to whom should

we entrust the programming?

In terms of human dignity,

answer is simply repellent.

IVliile

such an

the dangerous illusion of freedom

grows in those uncontrolled by knowledge or principle, actual freedom
is diminished.

The way out of this dilemma is to go back to the original

argument and affirm without qualification the second premise; knowledge can be taught.
ical reasons,

I

Since it was rejected, apparently, for empir-

feel it is legitimate to devote considerable space

(Chapter II) to explaining a psychological theory which should

cause us to reconsider.

The theory is that of Jean Piaget, who

claims that reason can be taught.

If that is the case, then a
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necessary condition for acquiring knowledge can be
reinstated.
Then, if it could be agreed that reason and
experience together

are sufficient for knowledge, and that both can be
taught (pro-

vided we understand "teaching” in the appropriate ways),
we could
claim that knowledge can be taught.
As for the first premise, it can now more easily be asserted

that knowledge is necessary for virtue, without seeming to exclude

great numbers of people from this more desirable prospect.
ter III,

I

shall attempt to support this claim; moreover,

In ChapI

shall

agree with Plato that knowledge is indeed sufficient for virtue.
However, the kind of knowledge

I

consider adequate is more inclusive

than what Plato seems to have required.

Wliereas he takes theoreti-

cal knowledge of the Good to be sufficient

(though not, in his later

position, necessary), it seems to me that this condition must be

made even more stringent.

If we are to carry out our good intentions

in particular acts, we must understand not only the criterion of

right action, but how to predict and control the consequences of
actual events
If we are still unable to conclude that knowledge, hence

virtue, can be taught, it should now be for a different reason.

The

same limitation would hold whether knowledge of the right principle

or only belief in that principle were used as a guide to right action.

It

is not

our ability to reason that is necessarily limited,

but our opportunity to experience.

that every individual

-

IVhile it cannot be

even with an ideal education

-

guaranteed
will turn out
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to be capable of achieving the necessary level
of reasoning, it is

quite probable that this is usually so and that there
is always at
least a way of maximizing reason.

But even if adequate reason were

universal, and each of us knew what he ideally ought to do,
we

would still be unable to know what we are in fact doing.

Reason,

though necessary, is not sufficient for the ongoing kinds of empirical judgments that the practice of virtue requires, since experi-

ence is never adequate to support such judgments.

The problem is

not that theoretical knowledge cannot be taught in certain cases,

but that empirical knowledge cannot be fully achieved in any.

Here

we must all rely to some extent on belief.

While it now appears that virtue is not something that can
be attained once and for all, even by the wisest of us, it becomes

instead something that can be approached by everyone, through a

process of continual self-correction.

Rather than attributing a

different form of virtue to those who are not yet, or not always,
able to decide correctly what action is required of them (confirming the suspicion that they can never do so, or simply don't want
to) and then calling such a state equally desirable

(thus justify-

ing external control), it seems to me important to maintain an ideal

toward which everyone can realistically strive and progress.

IVliile

we are all to some extent subject to the limitations imposed by

ignorance, these need not be compounded by our control of one
another.

My thesis, then, is this: without perfect knowledge, we
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cannot be perfectly virtuous.

reason

-

However, we can learn

to be more nearly so.

-

provided we

And insofar as virtue depends on

knowledge, and knowledge on reason, and reason
on a certain kind of
teaching, then virtue not only can but must be
taught, and in a

particular way.

With all its qualifications,

1

believe this is a

significant conclusion.
This is the argument

I

shall defend:

1.

Reason is necessary for virtue.

2.

Reason can be taught.

3.

A necessary means to virtue can be taught.

Chapter II will be devoted to an elaboration of the second premise,
with an explanation of Piaget's levels of intellectual development.

After Chapter III, in which

I

hope to justify the first premise,

I

shall describe Lawrence Kohlberg's corresponding levels of moral

development, and the ways in which they appear to depend upon the
growth of reason.

It will be seen that both reason and virtue exist

in what might be called progressive approximations, each derived

from and preferable to its predecessor.
While there is a remarkable parallel between the three parts

of the soul identified by Plato and Piaget's three major stages of
rational development, the crucial difference is that Plato sees the

relevant qualities as more or less fixed (in different proportions)
in three types of individuals, whereas Piaget would consider them

hierarchical, with each combination at least potentially characteristic of every individual over the course of his development, and

9

tending toward the more nearly rational.

Formal reason, and conse

quently moral autonomy, can thus be seen once
again as universally
legitimate aims of education.

10

REFERENCES FOR CHAPTER

I

Piaget To Understand Is To Invent (New York:
Grossman
Publishers, Viking Compass Edition, 1973),
p. 50.
>

2.

Plato, Meno, ed. Fulton H. Anderson, trans.
Benjamin Jowett
(New York: Bobbs-Merrill Company, Liberal Arts
Press, 1949),

Plato, Republic ed. and trans. Francis M. Cornford
(London:
Oxford University Press, 1941).
,

11

CHAPTER

II

REASON CAN BE TAUGHT

if logic is itself created rather than
being inborn
follows that the first task of education is
^
to form
reasoning.
The proposition "every person has the right
to
education".
means, therefore, in the first place,
"every human being has the right to be placed in a
scholastic environment during his formation which will
enable him
to build until completion the basic tools of
adaptation
which are the processes of logic."
.

.

.

It

.

.

Jean Piaget

1.

1

Ways of Teaching

The essence of Piaget's cognitive theory is that reason is
not a fixed endowment, but a construction to be progressively developed.

This idea can be contrasted with the view that reason is

qualitatively uniform, and furthermore that it

is given,

if at all,

in some greater or lesser measure to each individual.

As for the Platonic, rationalist, or apriorist epistemologies,
each believed it liad found some instrument of knowledge foreign, superior, or prior to the experiment.
But.
these
doctrines, although careful to characterize the qualities
they attributed to this instrument,
neglected to verify
that it was actually at the subject's disposal.
Here, whether
we wish it or not, there is a question of fact. (PE: 5)
.

.

.

.

.

From his observations of children, Piaget concluded that reason is
indeed present and operating, but often in precursory forms which
cannot be recognized,

IVhen

teachers themselves are not educated as

to the expectations they can have of their students, educational

efforts may easily be misdirected.

12

If it were true that reasoning ability is determined from

birth in respect to both its nature and its degree, there would remain only two variables to bear on the amount of knowledge available
to a given person: the data he receives and the way he processes it.

Educational objectives tend to line up accordingly.

On the one hand,

there is the communication of ideas, and on the other, the actual

exercise of reason.

The picture is slightly complicated by the fact

that each goal may be seen as a means to the other.

Ideas that lend

themselves to reflection and analysis may be introduced primarily to
engage the student in decision-making in order to develop in him,
for its own sake, the habit of aggressive, disciplined thought.

This may or may not be seen as a means of further increasing reasoning skill.

Alternatively, a student may be encouraged to reason

about a given problem in order to gain knowledge

-

to understand an

idea selected as important, and to recognize its truth in such a

way that certain general concepts become his own.
wide
In practice, although these interdependent purposes have

verbal acceptance, neither is very widely implemented in the ways

described.

For it appears that many students lack either sufficient

and
reasoning ability or the willingness to employ what they have,

furthermore that little can be done to change this.

One appears

or else the culforced to abandon either a large number of students

tivation of reason as an educational goal.
Wlien

merely an instruc
the latter occurs, the teacher becomes

to be the truth.
tor, who simply tells what he believes

This is to
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be remembered, with or without an
accompanying set of supporting

reasons, also perfunctorily memorized.

An alternative approach is

the experiential, direct discovery method,
which often goes on to

take account of the student's personal
interests and feelings,

either for their own sake or as a means of
keeping his attention.
In either case

-

whether the teacher or student

porter of information

-

the observations in question tend to remain

unevaluated.

the re-

is

For even when the importance of the student's
own

reasoning is not overlooked, it seems that one can do
no more than

hope for its natural unfolding at some predetermined time.

Without

the unifying purpose of shared critical judgments, selection of
con-

tent appears arbitrary, becoming a subject of dispute rather than

of deliberation.

Such a situation can degenerate into one of apathy

and aimlessness in which discipline becomes a serious problem, so
that the teacher is now not so much an instructor as a trainer.

Success is measured in terms of overt performance, with emphasis on
the results rather than the causes of behavior.

Reason can be restored to its legitimate role in the classroom,
and in the larger society, not by retrenchment to more rigorous

methods of selecting an educable blite, but by expansion of our un-

derstanding of

wliat

can be accomplished through teaching.

According

to Piaget, this includes not only the exercise of reason, with quan-

titative growth in both the content of knowledge and in the skill of

using such reasoning ability as one has; we can also count as an

objective the qualitative development of reason itself.

One can
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learn not only to reason better or to reason more, but to use a

better kind of reason.

While training and instruction are both

legitimate and important aspects of teaching, if they are employed

without an understanding of this idea the changes that result are
likely to be only superficial.

The most appropriate use of any

teaching method is in the service of true education: the cultivation of inner discipline.
What the teacher may "lead forth" from the child is not only
truth, but universal forms in which truths can be conceptualized

and communicated.

If Piaget is correct, these forms will vary in a

systematic, progressive way.

While he believes that certain very

general properties of reason are inherent in every person qua

organism, and that these properties remain constant, Piaget claims
that there can also be identified an orderly sequence of epigenetic

changes involving the active construction of logical structures and

their transformation into increasingly useful forms.

The level of

intellectual adaptation finally achieved by an individual is

determined neither by heredity nor environment alone, but by the
organizing activity through which he mediates between them.
Since only the order of development is fixed, and not its

timing or extent, the interaction of a child with his experience
can be influenced in such a way as to effect optimum growth, pro-

vided we learn to recognize reason in its progressive forms.

The

student can then be encouraged to engage in reasoning at his existstage, and
ing level of development, to mature at each foundational

15

finally to progress to the level which is
ordinarily considered the

only kind of reason there is.
changes are irreversible.

Unlike habits and beliefs, these

Once achieved, they provide the access

and the "tether” which makes knowledge, if
not permanent, at least
c

retrievable.

Although the acquisition of knowledge and practical

skills are worthwhile aims in themselves, they
must be considered

secondary to this even more fundamental aim of education.
The next three sections will introduce some of the
concepts

essential to understanding Piaget's theory of cognitive development.
In Section 5,

I

shall discuss further the implications of this

theory for the revision of educational goals and methods.

2.

Ways of Knowing

It is not by knowing the Pythagorean theorem that free
exercise of personal reasoning power is assured; it is in
having rediscovered its existence and its usage. ... It
is in learning to master the truth by oneself at the risk
of losing a lot of time and of going through all the roundabout ways that are inherent in real activity.

Jean Piaget

Piaget himself seldom speaks of

tlie

2

growth of reason, or even

of knowledge, as though either were a quantifiable entity.

Rather,

he is concerned with the development of the activity of knowing.

which is interdependent with the activity of reasoning.

For Piaget,

"this calculation is sufficient in itself, without our needing to
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hypostatize its result in the form of 'beings' or 'essences.'"
(BK:318)

With the understanding that "we are tending more and more

today to regard knowledge as a process more than as a state" (PE:
2),
we can distinguish three forms of knowledge, or ways of knowing^

The most primitive Piaget calls instinctive, a "knowing how" which
can be considered entirely non- theoretical

.

Instinctive knowledge

takes the form of a few generalized reflex mechanisms, whose primary

value for learning is to initiate the functioning of the organism

according to certain universal rules of organization.

But as for

specific "knowledge structured by hereditary programming," such as

perception of color and spatial dimension, "it is debatable whether
it has any real

extension."

(BK:266)

Unlike Kant, Piaget does not

believe the child has an inherent knowledge of cognitive structures
or "categories" by means of which to order reality.
As soon as repeated activities begin to be represented in

thought, instinct is quickly replaced by the complementary development of experimental

knowledge.

(or "physical")

and logico -mathematical

These correspond, respectively, to the explicative and

the implicative functions

(01:9), or, roughly, to the recognition

of truth and of validity.

Experimental knowledge, which provides

the variable content of intelligence, is derived exclusively from

experience of external objects, and with this as a criterion its

acquisition may be considered "authentic" learning.

(BK:306)

learning, however, requires a pre-existing cognitive framework.

Such
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knowledge about an object is always
an
assimilation into schemata, and these
schemata contain an
organization, however elementary, which may
be logical
or
^
mathematical.
(BK:335)

Logico-mathematical knowledge, abstracted from
the very activity of
knowing, is knowledge of form.

Although this kind of knowledge^, as

available to an individual, undergoes qualitative
change, its pro-

gressive structures follow normative laws.
The formation of increasingly adequate
logico-mathematical

schemata

I

take to be the development of what we may call
"reason,”

or the necessary condition for the ability to engage
in reasoning.

This development, which will be our main topic, will be
discussed

more fully

in-

the next two sections, where it will be seen that

logico-mathematical knowledge is "learned" in a somewhat different
•

The rest of this section will be concerned primarily with

experimental knowledge.
Perhaps the most significant thing for the teacher to under-

stand is that experimental knowledge can be acquired only through
the activity of the learner.
is by means

Like Dewey, Piaget believes that it

of our repeated manipulation of things that we are able

to extract their properties.

Knowledge is not a copy of reality. To know an object,, to
know an event, is not simply to look at it and make a mental
copy, or image, of it.
To know an object is to act on it.
To know is to modify, to transform the object, and to understand the process of this transformation.
(DL:8)
This activity is not limited to overt action on physical objects,
but may include symbolic or incipient action on theoretical ones.

Experimental knowledge thus comprehends ideas which are transmitted
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verbally, for it is

acquired by means of physical experience of
every type
that IS, the experience of external objects
or of whatever
appertains to them, abstraction being made of
objects
.

.

.

as such.

(BK 266)
:

this object may just as well be the action of conscioLisness of an external object, insofar as the
information
is obtained by observation or experiment.
... In introspection, the subject as seen constitutes an external
object
in relation to the subject as cognitive, whatever
"subjective"
errors the latter may make.
(BK: 333-4)
•

.

.

Instruction, like training, can be an effective means of education,

provided it is understood that collaboration by the student is
always a necessary condition for learning.
Tlie

activity of the learner is initiated and given direction

by his effort to integrate his experience into an existing conceptual

framework.

As new observations and ideas are encountered, provided

they are only slightly different from those already familiar, the

concepts being used are elaborated to accomodate them.

In this way

experimental knowledge becomes more comprehensive, more differentiated, and more highly organized

-

in short,

more adaptive.

The mind can only be adapted to a reality if perfect accomodation exists, tliat is to say, if nothing, in that reality,
intervenes to modify the subject's schemata.
(01:7)

Experimentation, enriched by the communication and "coordination of measurements supplied by different observers" (BK:337),

eventually results in knowledge which corresponds to a shared reality

-

process Piaget calls "decentration

a

.

experimental action is oriented in the direction of
Action does not
logico-mathematical decentering.
exclude objectivity; on the contrary, it is conducive to it.
.

.

.

.

.

.
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since it is extended into mathematical
operators whose
coordinations provide laws independent
of the subject as
individual ego.
(BK:337)
It

is

important to understand, however, that
objectivity is achieved

only gradually.

Instruction which goes far beyond the
student's

existing rational system simply cannot
be comprehended, no matter
how well it is supported with facts and
arguments.

There is a certain resistance to accomodation
caused by the
desire to preserve one's sense of intellectual
security, and to reinforce and strengthen present concepts through
their use
by assimilating new knowledge into them.

-

that is,

Successful assimilation

feels good and contributes to a feeling of
integrity which is still

compatible with external reality.

Paradoxically, the "egocentricity"

associated with this activity is the underlying motivation
for learning; one expands and adjusts his concepts a little in
order to be

able to continue using them.

However, experience which cannot be

seen as consistent with customary ways of thinking is denied, either
by being ignored altogether or by being rejected as "unreasonable."
I

tion

-

take reasoning to be the systematic evaluation of informa-

be it sensory data or a verbal assertion

-

to see whether and

how it can be integrated into an existing cognitive system.
Notion is indeed richer than perception.
Notion does
not consist merely in expressing the perceptive fact but
also (and often especially) in correcting it.
(PE:68-9)
.

.

.

New information can be considered learned, hence known, either when
it is recognized as implicit in knowledge already present or when its

admission extends and explains such knowledge.

In either case.

20

selectivity which depends upon active justification
by the learner

permanently strengthens the knowledge at his command,
since it requires continuous assessment and use of existing
structures.

certain aspects of reality cannot readily be assimilated

IVhen

c

in this way, yet become too insistent to be ignored,
successful

adaptation may require that experimental knowledge undergo a major

reorganization involving something more than the elaboration of
specific concepts.

The very rules of reason are restructured in

such a way that they both comprehend previous forms and are adapted
to a kind of physical knowledge which is more general, and therefore

more useful in explaining experienced facts.

The introduction of a

new rational concept may clear up a whole set of difficulties, and
at the same time it creates new ones by altering the balance of

existing schemata.

The continuous reorganization of the rules of

reasoning constitutes the ''learning'' of logico-mathematical knowledge, or of reason itself.

These nales are not at first consciously recognized; they are

implemented long before they are abstracted.

New schemes are

"known" when they work and can be put to use.

structures do
behavior (only vsfhen
does the individual
awareness is always
.

.

.

not belong to consciousness but to
there is some sort of dis-adaptation
become aware of structures, and this
(STR:99)
quite dim and partial.

Logico-mathematical knowledge is not known by the individual as such,
but by the epistemic sub j ect
is common to all

,

that is, the "cognitive nucleus which

subjects at the same level."

STR;139)

Tliat

the
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individual has a practical understanding is evidenced by
his behavior, and not by any theoretical formulation.

the always fragmentary and frequently distorting grasp
of consciousness must be set apart from the achievements of
the subject what lie knows is the outcome of his intellectual
activity, not its mechanisms.
(STR: 139)
•

.

.

j

c.

Learning reason is, again, an active process, but one whose
object is in this case the form rather than the empirical content
of knowing.

In order to

distinguish such learning from the acqui-

sition of experimental knowledge,

ment.”

I

have referred to it as "develop-

However, this should not be taken to imply that the growth

of reason is merely

a

matter of maturation

-

that it is programmed

from birth, or that it cannot be influenced by teaching as well as
by other kinds of experience.

Piaget makes the point that a much

better term would be "construction."
ing,

For we cannot, strictly speak-

say that structures are discovered, since "one can only dis-

cover what already exists, whether it is within or outside one's

person."

(BK;318)

Neither can they be invented, inasmuch as in-

vention implies free choice.
We are thus compelled to think of the construction of logicomathematical structures in the form, not of a development
that is integrated unpredictably with external elements, but
as a kind of endogenous evolution going forward in stages.
These stages are of such a kind that the combinations characteristic of any one of them will be new as combinations,
yet based intirely upon the elements already present in the
(BK;318-19)
preceding stage.
In

discussing the learning of experimental knowledge and its

relation to the construction of more advanced logico-mathematical
structures, we have assumed the presence of some such structures yet
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denied that they are innate.

But neither can they be drawn
directly

from experience of the external world,
which would not even be in-

telligible without their prior existence.

This is true even of per-

ception, where "cognitive contact with the
object perceived is not
c

just a recording or mere 'reading' of
experience."

(BK:335)

We need hardly point out that, for a copy
to serve as arbiter
in a case of conflict, we would have
to trust it as a true
copy, which would require some other means
of access to its
original than through it.
(STR:72)
If logico-mathematical knowledge is a distinct
way of knowing which

serves as such an arbiter, and if it is in fact also learned,
this

learning process must clearly be the primary concern of the
teacher.
We shall next consider the origin of logico-mathematical

structures and the general principles of their continued construction.
The following section will describe the sequential forms in which
these structures can be recognized in the growing individual.

Finally,

we shall review the way in which reason can be developed in conjunc-

tion with the teaching of experimental knowledge and through the in-

formed use of methods which are already familiar.

3.

How Reason is Formed

the progress of reason doubtless consists in an
increasingly advanced acquisition of awareness of the
organizing activity inherent in life itself.
.

.

.

Jean Piaget

3

How can we account for the origin of universal logico-
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mathematical structures?

Not through empirical
generalization, for

reason is not "out there” waiting to
be apprehended.

If the laws of

logic applied to the physical world
so that they could be

discovered from outside, as the laws of
physics are
then there Cvvould) no longer (be)
anything "necessary” about
them in the deductive and axiomatic sense
of the term.
If
on the other hand, the laws of logic
were universal
they would be innate and would manifest
themselves in’ infancy
Now this IS just not so.
Their necessity is brought
about by a gradual construction.
(BK:315-16)
.

.

.

.

.

.

Moreover, we have seen that some endogenous
structuration is pre-

requisite to experimental learning, and cannot itself
be "learned”
in the same sense.
it is not comparison that supports generalization,
but
the other way around.
If, as we believe to be the case, the
unconscious activity of the mind consists in imposing forms
upon content, and if these forms are fundamentally the same
for all minds.
it is necessary and sufficient to grasp the
unconscious structure underlying each institution and each
custom in order to obtain a principle of interpretation valid
for other institutions and other customs.
•

•

.

,

.

.

.

The alternative seems to be that rational structures are in-

herent in the species, at least in some germinal form.
if this knowledge is not brought about by empirical
learning but simply constitutes the necessary condition for
the organization and recording of experience, will it not then
have to be considered ipso facto as being hereditary by nature? Yes and no.
(BK:313)
.

.

.

.

.

.

"No,” says Piaget, if we mean well-defined structures that give spe-

cific information.

He rejects the "new rationalism” whose search for

the "unconscious structures” underlying thought is represented by

Chomsky's "generative grammar”
language is elaborated.

-

a

"fixed innate scheme” from which

(STR: 74-96)

Piaget agrees that it is logic
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which is the basis for language, and not the
reverse, but denies
that this logic is innate.
the mirror of logic."

thought.

So it cannot be said that "thought is

On the contrary, logic is derived from

(STR:53)
t

...

to think is to produce

thought being a kind of
"theoretical practice" which is not so much the work of
an individual subject as the outcome of interactions
between the subject and his personal environment
(SIR: 125-6)
,

Thought, which first occurs as a non-verbal representation of

activity, is in turn prefigured by experience.

The first thing of

which the infant is aware is his own movement.
when thought or representative intelligence begins to
function, it starts from zero in its conceptual content,
though not, of course, in its sensorimotor or perceptual
data.
(BK:333)
.

.

.

As innate behavior patterns are repeated and coordinated with each

other and with the environment, there occurs the first "splintering
off" of logico-mathematical knowledge from hereditary structuration.
the processes of repetition, ordering, and associative
connecting whereby the sensori-motor schemata become coordinated themselves contain the source of Chomsky's "monoid."
.

.

.

(STR:91)

Thereafter, "logico-mathematical structures fill the same sort of
role at the representational level as do hereditary frameworks at
the initial learning stages."

(BK:335)

As has already been suggested, Piaget believes that the rules

for the earliest cognitive structures are derived from the infant's

awareness of the rhythms of his own physical activity, which is initiated by instinct and governed by universal biological principles.
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though it would not do to say that all vital processes
are "intelligent," it can be maintained that.
life is
geometrizing; today we may go so far as to say that in many
respects life works like a cybernetic machine, an "artificial"
or "general" intelligence.
(SIR: 114)
.

.

.

.

It

is as

.

general coordinations of actions" that logico-mathematical

knowledge is "already at work in some elementary or immanent form in
every cognitive functioning."

(BK:267-68)

Its form is

based on the internal conditions of each functioning
(that is, on those general forms of organization which extend
beyond cognitive assimilation and back into the common mechanisms, hence, to those processes which lie at the heart of
any living organization).
(BK:267)
.

.

.

.

It is

.

.

because of the generality of the functional principles

"common to all sensorimotor coordinations" (STR:62-3) that logico-

mathematical forms can be derived from them which are both stable and
adaptable to experienced reality.

But the inference directly from

the stability of these forms to their innateness is going too far.
First, it does not really deal with the problem of origin,

(STR;12)

for "even when a trait is recognized as hereditary, the question of
its formation remains."
is as

(SIR: 89)

More important, specific heredity

finite and contingent as experience.
if a priori evolve like some biological characteristic,
being prior conditions for every kind of experimental knowledge and fixed in heredity as instincts or innate conceptual
frameworks, then they must lose, along with their uniqueness
and their universality (since they vary from species [to
the very
species] and are fixated in man as he is now.
)
thing which gave them their chief value, which was their
(BK:314-15)
necessity.
.

.

.

.

.

Whereas inherited structures would be "essentially limiting,

.

.

.

the deductive and organizing activity of the mind is unlimited and
leads.

.

.

to generalizations which surpass intuition."

(10:2)

We
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shall see that

.

.

necessity, instead of being the
prior condi-

learning, is its outcome

.

"

(STR:62)

Logic can be thought of as hereditary
only in the sense that
it is formed within the constraints
of "certain necessary and irre-

ducible conditions" (01:3) which are not
so much inherited as they
are conserved and perpetuated from one
generation to the next.
313 and 323)

It can also be

(BK:

thought of as acquired, but by abstrac-

tion from the experience of internal processes
rather than of the
external world.

reason does not evolve without reason; ... it develops
by virtue of internal necessities which impose themselves
in
the course of its interactions with the external
environment
.

.

.

.

.

.

(STR:119)

It turns out that the innatists and empiricists are
both partly

right.

The source of reason is neither entirely within the indi-

vidual nor outside him, but in the laws governing the concrete in-

teractions that take place as instinctive behavior patterns are
repeated, modified, and coordinated.
The functions which account for the orderly construction of

logico-mathematical structures are the self-regulatory processes by
which every living system conserves itself as a coherent whole.
Reason develops

within the framework of the two most general biological
functions: organization and adaptation.
They are two
complementary processes of a single mechanism, the first being
the internal aspect of the cycle of which adaptation constitutes the external aspect.
(01:4-7)
.

.

.

.

Organization

,

.

.

which preserves the inherent balance and unity of the

individual organism, is reflected intellectually as consistency of
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thought.

The universal organizing function
remains constant

throughout the evolution of the cognitive
structures

;

although the

child's logic IS incomplete, differing in
form as well as in content from that of the adult, there is
always maintained an independent validity.

The nature of the autoregulatory mechanisms
employed

will be considered in connection with the
kinds of intellectual

structures that are governed by these functions
(Section 4).
Because self-preservation by means of self-organizing
activity occurs within a context of change, the individual
is also re-

quired to fit himself into a larger order.

He must maintain a

successful balance, not only within himself, but at the same time

between himself and the environment that nourishes him.

Adaptation

is an active response to the demands imposed by transactions
between

the individual and his surroundings, and intelligence

brated form of all cognitive functions" (STR:114)

-

-

"the equili-

develops as a

highly effective means of adaptation.

behavior is at the mercy of every possible disequilibrating factor, since it is always dependent on an environment which has no fixed limits and is constantly fluctuating.
Thus, the autoregulatory function of the cognitive mechanisms
produces the most highly stabilized equilibrium forms found
in any living creature, namely, the structures of intelli.

.

.

gence.

.

.

.

(BK:37)

Successful human adaptation, or change, is very largely a

matter of achieving this intellectual equilibrium.
Life is a continuous creation of increasingly complex forms
and a progressive balancing of those forms with the environment.
The organism adapts itself by materially constructing new forms to fit them into those of the universe,
whereas intelligence extends this creation by constructing
.

.

.
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mentally structures which can be applied to those
of the
environment. ...
If things perceived or known are a
limited part of the environment to which the
organism tends
to adapt, a reversal of these relationships
subsequently
takes place.
(01:3-4)

Adaptation is the "functional invariant" which accounts for
the
tendency toward objectivity in experimental knowledge and for
the
evolution of logico-mathematical structures which will accomodate
more and more of external reality.

While the laws of organization

regulate the form of knowledge, those of adaptation determine the
fact of learning;

"...

consists of adaptation."

everything in intellectual development
(01:5)

The adaptive process is an equilibration of two complementary

functions: assimilation and accomodation

.

In general,

assimilation

is the "integration of any sort of reality into a structure"

(DL:18),

and this function includes the "furnishing" and reinforcement of

cognitive structures.
in every case intellectual adaptation involves an
element of assimilation, that is to say, of structuring
through incorporation of external reality into forms due
to the subject’s activity.
(01:6)
.

.

.

The principle of "functional assimilation" is expressed as a tendency
to repeat familiar patterns of thought and behavior, and to internal-

ize selected aspects of one’s surroundings as fuel for this activity.

Since both the subject and object will have changed slightly with
each exchange, exact repetition is impossible and disequilibrium
occurs.

Accomodation is the compensatory, externalizing process

whereby the individual yields and adjusts to the particularities
of each new situation.

Accomodation is therefore most closely
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associated with change; more specifically, it brings
about learning,
or growth in experimental knowledge.

Assimilation is self-preserving and transforms the environment; accomodation is truth-preserving and changes the individual.

One must constantly coordinate these two variables by working
out
in each case a new reciprocal relationship which both protects

internal equilibrium and expands the scope of possible transactions.

There is adaptation when the organism is transformed by the
environment and when this variation results in an increase
in the interchanges between the environment and itself which
are favorable to its preservation.
(01:5)
Such interchanges continue to modify the environment as well as the

subject who is accomodating to it.

As adaptive growth perpetuates

itself, both physical and intellectual activity influence the form

and availability of external resources upon which to draw in the
future.
It is worth noting again that the individual always attempts

to keep learning under his control, and spontaneously undertakes the

difficult task of accomodation insofar as it is seen as beneficial.
animals "choose" and "modify" their environment before
submitting to its influences.
That is just what behavior is: a mixture of choice from, and effect upon, the enLearning
vironment, exerting optimal control over exchanges.
creature
living
for
as
the
is no exception to this definition,
sigassimilates
acquires new conditioning or new habits, it
the
on
imposes
nals and organizes action schemata that it then
undergoing
environment at the same time as it is itself
(BK:32)
environmental influence.
.

.

.

.

.

.

The chief benefit of accomodation is that it makes possible further

assimilation.

The more this is recognized, the less is learning a

reaction to unavoidable intrusions and the more it becomes an active
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striving to comprehend.

During the overall course of
cognitive

development, as well as within each of
its stages, "decentering"
occurs through a shift in emphasis from
assimilation to accomodation,
until at maturity they are brought
into balance.
c

The egocentricity associated with
assimilation and characteristic of the earliest stages of development
is due less to preference
than to necessity.

IVlUle the small

child clearly must undergo a

great deal of accomodation to the surroundings
into which he is born,

there is an even greater need for him to begin by
assimilating from
them.

This is because assimilation is the source of
the first

logico-mathematical structuration.
the function.
chiefly credited for the formation
of structures v/as "assimilation," our structuralist substitute for atomistic "association"
•

.

.

.

.

....

Psychologically (behaviorally) considered, assimilation is
the process whereby a function, once exercised, presses
toward repetition, and in "reproducing" its ovsm activity
produces a schema into which the objects propitious to its
exercise, whether familiar ("recognitory assimilation") or
new ("generalizing assimilation"), become incorporated.
So assimilation, the process or activity common to all forms
of life, is the source of that continual relating, setting up

of correspondences, establishing of functional connections,
and so on, which characterizes the early stages of intelligence.
And it is assimilation, again, which finally gives rise to
those general schemata we called structures.
Assimilation is the functional aspect of structure-formation.
sooner or later leading to the mutual assimilation of structures to one another.
(STR:71-72)
.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

By means of functional assimilation, innate behavior patterns pro-

duce the earliest sensorimotor schemata, and the coordination of

these schemata is the source of a new and more complex form which
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incorporates and preserves the previous ones.
Indeed, it is not a question of adding
another story to an
edifice to which it bears no relation; rather,
we have here
a group of syntheses or structurations
which, although new
are a direct and natural extension of the
preceding ones
and fill in some of the gaps left by them.
(PC: 131)
(.

The increasingly complex "materials” for construction
of

cognitive structures are furnished through a process
Piaget calls

reflective abstraction

.

Abstraction is made, not of the properties

of objects, but of the logico-mathematical laws governing
actions

performed upon objects.
Examination of child behavior in regard to objects shows
that there exist two kinds of experiments and two kinds of
abstractions depending on whether the experiment is based
on things themselves and allows for discovery of some of
their characteristics, or whether it is based on coordinations, which were not in things but that the action, in
utilizing the latter, had introduced for its own require,

ments.

(PE: 29)

A classic example is that of the child who discovers that he has a

given number of pebbles, and that the number stays constant no matter
in what order they are arranged.

"Actually he experiments not on

the pebbles, which he uses merely as instruments, but on his own

action of order and enumeration."

(PE: 30)

In doing so, he enriches

the objects with logico-mathematical characteristics (order and

number) which they did not have independently.
This "de-centering makes the subject enter upon, not so much
an already available and therefore external universality, as an

uninterrupted process of coordinating and setting in reciprocal relations."

(STR:139)

At higher levels, the structures of formal

reason are abstracted from existential intellectual operations, which
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were in turn derived from concrete
experimentation.

Progress

through the sequential stages of
logico-mathematical structuration
occurs when action is thus "reflected"
by being projected onto

a

more general plane, i.e. from action
to thought, and from "concrete"
thought to abstract.

Reflection is defined as "a rearrangement,
by

means of thought, of some matter
previously presented to the subject
in a rough or immediate form."

(BK:320)

Each new construction, while complete
and coherent in itself,
is

"open" in that it is subject to incorporation
into a "stronger"

structure of which it is a subsystem.

Following the cybernetic

model, successive forms follow from, and not
simply upon, their

predecessors.

(STR:134)

This process.
takes the form of a succession of levels
of equilibrium, of levels which have a certain
probability
which I shall call a sequential probability, that is,
the
probabilities are not established a priori.
Each level
is determined as the most probable given that the
preceding
level has been reached.
(DL:14)
.

.

.

.

.

Through the interplay of reflective abstraction.
and of
equilibration (self-regulation) mechanisms, which make for
internal reversibility, structures - in being constructed give rise to that necessity which a priorist theories have
always thought it necessary to posit at the outset.
(STR:62)
.

.

Reason can thus progress indefinitely, as it must in order to explain
itself.

From the logical angle, Gddel demonstrated as long ago as
1930.
that a system which is otherwise sufficient for its
own purposes.
cannot by its own or weaker means, succeed
in verifying its own noncontradiction.
(BK:319)
.

.

.

.

Richer structures can, however, explain previous ones by incorporating and reorganizing them at a more advanced level of equilibrium.
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Using inadequate forms as content, we
can go beyond the limits of
a system

.

a

not by generalizing or merely extending
it, but by
stracting from its results an operation
that makes possible
construction of a new structure, which
includes the old.
.

.

(.BK:319)

c

The adaptive value of logico-mathematical
knowledge lies in
its versatility,

mation.

and this is largely due to the method of
its for-

Because "the phenotype, instead of being an
uninteresting

epiphenomenon, [is] in fact the outcome of interaction
between the
genotype and the environment" (BK:272), there is wide
scope for

accomodation to new circumstances.
to the intellectual,

At every level from the genetic

"recombination exiploits mutation by means of

efficient combinatorial systems," and this process

provides an explanation for those vital initiatives
taken by living creatures in the course of evolution, whereas
chance or selection alone offer none (for selection only produces effects of immediate utility).
(BK:279)
.

.

.

Man has the singular advantage of being able to take such

initiatives on a theoretical plane before attempting to implement
them.
No doubt "pure" mathematics does exist, quite free of any
actual application, but it is nonetheless related to objects
of some kind and remains essentially an instrument for
adaptation to the real world even if it goes beyond it (and
because it goes beyond it).
(BK:334)
,

The construction of meaning furnishes the alternatives which not

only enrich human life but make possible its self-perpetuation.

other animals cannot alter themselves except by
changing their species, man can transform liimself by transforming the world and can structure himself by constructing
structures; and these structures are his own, for they are

IVliereas
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As each individual recapitulates
the progress of previous
generations

by a process of "convergent
reconstructions with overtaking" (or

regression)
nients but

(BK:331-33), he is able to profit from
their accomplish-

is not

4.

limited to them.

Stages of Intellectual Development

The characteristic of intelligence is not to
contemplate
but to "transform" and its mechanism is essentially
opera^
tory.

Jean Piaget^

We have said that the development of reason consists in the

construction of increasingly adaptive logico-mathematical structures,
and have described in general terms the "functional invariants"

(organization and adaptation) which persist throughout their evolution and help account for it.

Here we shall consider the structures

themselves, and with them the specific regulatory mechanisms by which

organization is maintained in spite of both internal and external
change.

Focus will be mainly upon the "operational" structures which

characterize the appearance of reason on the plane of thought.'
A structure may be defined as a "system closed under transfor-

mation" (STR:6), or a "systematic whole of self-regulating transfor-

mations" (STR:44).

The key notions are those of wholeness, transfor-

mation, and self- regulation (or equilibration).

Like the living
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organism, which is "in a way, the paradigm
structure" (STR:44),

knowledge occurs not simply as an aggregate
of independent elements

with their particular attributes, but
as

a

dynamic system whose form

is due to its organizational properties.
t

elements of a structure are subordinated to
laws
and It IS in terms of these laws that the
structure ^qua
whole or system is defined.
(STR:7)
‘

The laws which make a structure intelligible
are those govern
ing its transformations.

Although it need not be temporal, change

is always inherent in a structure.

Were it not for the idea of transformation, structures
would
lose all explanatory import, since they would collapse
into
static forms.
(STR:12)

A structure becomes self-conserving within stable boundaries,
and in
this sense

closed," when it is governed by laws of transformation

which never lead beyond the system.

Once an area of knowledge has been reduced to a self-regulating system or "structure," the feeling that one has at
last come upon its innermost source of movement is hardly
avoidable.
(STR:14)
Such laws maintain the unity and coherence of a whole by regulating
the function of equilibration, that "general formative process in

nature " (STR:113) which accounts for the construction of cognitive
structures.

".

.

.

the essential function of logical operations.

is to set up systems of control and autocorrection."

.

(BK:28)

The most elementary autoregulatory mechanisms are the instinc

tive rliythms found in all forms of life.

The "reproduction" (func-

tional assimilation) and coordination of "rhythm-structures" results
in sensorimotor schemata governed by "regulations."

Regulations
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are partially reversible, probabilistic
laws which "depend on the

interplay of anticipation and correction
(feedback)" (STR:15-16)
and which are associated with
structures whose transformations are

temporal.

Practical logic appears at the level of
thought with

the construction of cognitive structures
which are governed by

"operations."

A true operation is a "perfect regulation."
and "an

operational system is one which excludes errors
before they are
made."

(SIR: 15)

Because they have the properties of both reversi-

bility and associativity, operations offer the
first opportunity to
make informed choices of action.

Finally, just as the practical

operations were abstracted from the assimilation and equilibration
of regulations, formal logic is derived from the integration of
the

"concrete" operations.
Rhythm regulation operation - these are the three basic
mechanisms of self-regulation and self-maintenance. One may,
if one so desires, view them as the "real" stages of a
structure's "construction," or, reversing the sequence, one
may use operational mechanisms of a quasi-Platonic and nontemporal sort as the "basis" from which the others are then
in some manner "derived."
(SIR: 16)
,

,

In order to illustrate how a system is governed by an opera-

tion, it will be useful to consider the mathematical "group" as a

prototype rational structure.
elements

(e.g.

(SIR: 19)

A group is a system of

the integers) with an operation or rule of combina-

tion (e.g. addition).

It has

the following properties:

(STR:18)

1.

Performed upon the elements of the set, the operation
yields only elements of the set.

2.

The set contains an identity element (0) which is unaffected by being combined with any other element of
the set (n + 0 = n)
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The operation has an inverse (subtraction)
which, when
combined with it, yields the identity element*

3.

(+

n

-

n = 0)

The operation and its inverse are associative:

4.

(n

+

m)

+

1

=

II

+

(m +

i).

The identity element is essential in order for
change to^be

understood as

a

transformation, "an intelligible change which does

not transform things beyond recognition at one
stroke, and which

always preserves invariance in certain respects."

(STR:20)

Because

of the two restrictive conditions of re vers ib i 1 i
ty (the inverse operation always makes possible a return to the starting point) and

associativity

(the same goal is attainable by alternate routes),

any system having a group structure has an inherent logic.
This self-regulation is really the continual application of
three of the basic principles of rationalism: the principle
of non-contradiction, which is incarnate in the reversibility
of transformations; the principle of identity, which is
guaranteed by the permanence of the identity element; and the
principle, less frequently cited but just as fundamental,
according to which the end result is independent of the
route taken.
(STR:20)

The group is an algebraic structure in which reversibility
takes the form of inversion or negation.

order and topological structures.

In addition,

there are

The former have as their prototype

the lattice or network, where reversibility occurs as reciprocity
(e.g.

A

<.'

B

transforms into B>A).

Finally, there are the topological

structures, which form the basis of geometry and incorporate the

notions of neighborhood, continuity, and limit.

These "parent

structures" constitute "three not further reducible 'sources' of
all other structures"

(STR:24) which can be be constructed by the
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combination or differentiation of their
restrictive conditions.
(STR:25)
Wliile the Bourbaki

mathematicians were discovering these

abstract "mother structures,"

Piaget's study of psychogenetic
c

development simultaneously revealed that
the earliest copitive operations, those
which grow
directly out of handling things, can be divided
in precisely three large categories, according to whether
revers
ibility takes the form of "inversion," of "reciprocity,"
or of "continuity" and "separation."
(STR:26)
•

.

.

He was thus led to conclude that the logico-mathematical
parent

structures

correspond to coordinations that are necessary to all
intellectual activity, though they be very elementary, even
rudimentary, and quite lacking in generality in the, earliest
stages of intellectual development.
(STR:27)
.

.

.

Logico-mathematical schemata cannot be considered true structures until they come to be regulated by operations having one of
the three forms of reversibility.

This achievement, which occurs at

around seven or eight years of age, marks the third of four major
levels of intellectual growth and constitutes a synthesis of earlier

constructions.

At the most primitive sensorimotor level, assimila-

tion schemata are coordinated into schemes for direct action on

reality (e.g. displacement groups, the scheme of the permanent, object, inclusion and order structures).

(BK:321)

During the pre -

operational stage, which begins at about eighteen months to two
years with the appearance of the semiotic function, these practical

structures are internalized and "reconstructed into thought structures" (BK;321) which can now in turn be coordinated (e.g. the
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concept of number is constructed as a
synthesis of seriation and
inclusion).

(PE:37-44)

The semiotic function, which makes
possible these coordinations, is not limited to speech, but
includes imitative and symbolic

actions.

Such symbols may take the form of incipient
movements,

drawings, etc. as well as images.

Representative intelligence begins with the child's
systematic concentration on his ovm action and on
the momentary
igurative aspects of the segments of reality with which
this
action deals.
Later it arrives at a decentering based on the
general coordination of action, and this permits the
formation of operatory systems of transformations and constants
or
conservations which liberate the representation of reality
from its deceptive figurative appearances.
(PC: 128)
Finally, words become the signifiers that follow and re-evoke
compre-

hension of meaning.

Language allows the child "to reconstitute his

past actions in the form of recapitulation and to anticipate his

future actions through verbal representation."

(SS:17)

Representation in thought lets the individual consider

a

whole

all at once, free of the limitations of space, time, and sequence,

and thus to grasp the concept of reversibility as an instrument of

self-regulation.

The period following its appearance is one of

transition from trial-and-error activity to action governed by operations.
(e.g.

In an existential sense, operations are the general acts

uniting, ordering) which "enter into all coordinations of par-

ticular actions."

(PC:96)

By thinking about his

o\^m

acts of this

kind, the child abstracts the corresponding intellectual schemes.

The construction of an "operational" structure can be illustrated by the following example.

IVhen a

pre-operational child is
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asked to roll

a

ball of clay into a sausage
shape, it is at first

most probable that he will focus
on only one dimension (length)
or
the other (width), and will
treat them independently.
In the first
case, he will say that the clay
has grown larger, since it is
longer.
At some point he will notice its
increasing narrowness, and say now

that there is less.

At a third stage he will
oscillate between

length and width, until at a fourth
he discovers their inverse rela-

tionship

.

IVhen he

is

able to make the compensation necessary
for equili-

bration of these two opposing variables, the
child has formed an

algebraic structure which has an identity element
(in this case, conservation of substance) and a reversible operation.

(DL:14)

The

structure becomes closed because "the relations within
it are interdependent and can be composed among themselves without
recourse to

anything outside the system."

(BK:316)

The perceived correspondence

now appears necessary,

.and this logical "necessity" is recognized not only by
some inner feeling, which cannot be proved, but by the intellectual behavior of the subject, who uses the newly mastered
deductive instrument with confidence and discipline.
(BK:316)
.

.

This third level, that of the concrete operations

,

is

so called

because the mechanisms being used "relate directly to objects and not
yet to verbally stated hypotheses."

(PC: 100)

Progress has been made

in that images are now anticipatory, and not simply reproductive of

transformations and their results (PC:74-79), but the child is still
dependent on the figurative, as opposed to the purely operative.
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aspects of his experience.

Transformational laws are coordinated

into relatively weak systems called
"groupings'- (e.g. classifica-

tions, seriations, correspondences,
matrices) which make possible

new notions of conservation.

The operations involved are only
^

partly associative, and the structures
they form "permit only stepby step reasoning, for lack of generalized
combinations."

(PC;100)

Several years are spent in consolidating and
stabilizing these new

instruments, which eventually become general
and permanent in the

absence of their objects.

During adolescence, the child finally "succeeds
in freeing

himself from the concrete and in locating reality
within
possible transformations."

(PC: 130)

a group of

This "final fundamental de-

centering" marks the beginning of the period of formal
operations

,

which is characterized by the ability to coordinate ideas (including
ideas of actions) by means of propositional logic.
By comparison with a child, an adolescent is an individual
who constructs systems and "theories." The child does not
build systems. Those which he possesses are unconscious or
preconscious in the sense that they are unformulable or
unformulated so that only an external observer can understand them, while he himself never "reflects" on them.
In
other words, he thinks concretely, he deals with each
problem in isolation and does not integrate his solutions
by means of any general theories from which he could abstract
a common principle.
(SS:6i)

Just as the concrete operations were derived from thinking
about action, formal operations result from thinking about thinking.

The individual can now perform "operations on operations" (PC: 138),
that is, he can reason without intuitive ties to content, forming

arguments about possible truths and dealing with hypothetico-

deductive problems in a systematic and
exhaustive way.

Long courses

of action can be rehearsed in the mind, and
their consequences con-

sidered without the need to act out each step.
Formal reasoning becomes possible due to the
synthesis of

previous groupings into a fully associative
combinatorial system
which integrates the two fundamental forms of
reversibility found
in concrete algebraic and order structures.

Henceforth every operation will at once be the inverse of
another and the reciprocal of a third, which gives four
transformations: direct, inverse, reciprocal, and the inverse
of the reciprocal.
(PC: 138-9)
.

.

.

This "INRC group” (identity, negation, reciprocity, correlativity)
is the basis

for a richer logic which includes such new operations

as implication,

136)

disjunction, exclusion, incompatibility, etc.

(PC:

Within the system Piaget identifies sixteen such "binary oper-

ations” which can now be systematically performed on all combinations
of two values

(p

and p^ of each of two factors

in four possible outcomes

(p

+ q,

(p

and q)

,

resulting

p + q, p + q, p + q)

Liberation from observed content represents a significant
accomodation, and a new level of decentration.

Autoregulation by

means of "pure” reason is carried out at a more stable level of

organization, and is at the same time far more adaptive in

ibility and efficiency.

its,

flex-

But egocentricity manifests itself, as it

does at the beginning of each new level,
the omnipotence of reflection.”

in the form of "belief in

(SS:64)

metaphysical age par excellence the self is
strong enough to reconstruct the universe and big enough to
It

is the

;

43

incorporate it.
Equilibrium is attained when the
adolescent understands that the proper
function of reflection IS not to contradict but to
predict and interpret
experience.
This formal equilibrium surpasses
by far the
equilibrium of concrete thought because
it not only encompasses the real world but also the
undefined constructions
ot rational deduction and inner life.
(SS; 64 )
.

.

.

Mastery of formal operations allows the
individual to

organize his beliefs in a given area into a
closed theoretical

system which accounts for all relevant possibilities
and in which
the concept of knowledge takes on new meaning.

Given certain pro

visional truths, others can be seen to follow with
logical necessity.

This most difficult level of logic takes the longest
to

achieve, and development through at least three identifiable
sub-

stages continues well into adulthood.
In most adults,

(See the table following.)

full development is never completed.

Average ages at which the various levels of logical development typically appear are also given in the table which follows.
It should be

clearly understood, however, that the notion "stage

follows age" does not apply in this case, as it does for physical

maturation and perhaps for certain social dispositions (e.g. the
"terrible twos" and the "noisy nines").

Logical stages do not ap-

pear simply with the passage of time, but are definitely influenced
by experience as well as by individual differences in rates of
growth.

Since it is not possible to skip stages, but rather to

progress from an already familiar way of thinking to the next most

satisfactory level, the role of the teacher is to provide the proper
experience at the proper time.
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PIAGET'S ERAS AND STAGES OF LOGICAL
AND COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT^

ERA

Sensorimotor Intelligence

I

(ave D- 2

'
'i

Stage

1

Reflex action.

Stage

2:

Coordination of reflexes and sensorimotor repetition
(primary circular reaction).

Stage

3:

Activities to make interesting events in the environment reappear (secondary circular reaction).

Stage 4:

Means/ends behavior and search for absent objects.

Stage

Experimental search for new means (tertiary circular
reaction)

5:

Stage 6:

Use of imagery in insightful invention of new means
and in recall of absent objects and events.

ERA II

Symbolic, Intuitive, or Prelogical Thought (age 2-51

Inference is carried on through images and symbols which do not
maintain logical relations or invariances with one another. "Magical thinking" in the sense of (a) confusion of apparent or imagined
events with real events and objects and (b) confusion of perceptual
appearances of qualitative and quantitative change with actual change

ERA III

Concrete Operational Thought

(age 6-10)

Inference carried on through system of classes, relations, and
quantities maintaining logically invariant properties and which
refer to concrete obj ects
These include such logical processes as
(a) inclusion of lower-order classes in higher order classes; (b)
transitive seriation (recognition that if a>b and b>c, then a>c;
(c) logical addition and multiplication of classes and quantities;
(d) conservation of number, class membership, length, and mass under
apparent change.
.
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PIAGET’S ERAS AND STAGES OF LOGICAL AND
COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT

ERA III

(Continued)

Substage

1

Formation of stable categorical classes.

Substage

2

Formation of quantitative and numerical relations
of
invariance

ERA IV

Formal Operational ThouRht

Inferences
tions upon
of systems
deductive i

<

(age 11 to adulthood)

through logical operations upon propositions or "operaoperations.
Reasoning about reasoning.
Construction
of all possible relations or implications. Hypotheticosolation of variables and testing of hypotheses.

Substage

1

Formation of the inverse of the reciprocal.
Capacity
to form negative classes (for example, the class of
all not-crows) and to see relations as simultaneously
reciprocal (for example, to understand that liquid in
a U-shaped tube holds an equal level because of
counterbalanced pressures).

Substage

2

Capacity to order triads of propositions or relations
(for example, to understand that if Bob is taller than
Joe and Joe is shorter than Dick, then Joe is the
shortest of the three).

Substage

3

True formal thought.
Construction of all possible
combinations of relations, systematic isolation of
variables, and deductive hypothesis-testing.
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Even when stages of development are
appreciated, diagnosis is

complicated by the fact that there are "all
sorts of overlaps."
171)

(PP;

That the stages appear in an invariant
sequence "does not ex-

clude either telescoping or even momentary
individual regressions."
(PP:171)

Furthermore, there are no clearcut boundaries
between' one

level and another.

The achievement of equilibrium for one phase

marks the beginning of disequilibrium for the next.

Defined levels

are only idealizations of average potential abilities;
transitions
are gradual and continuous.

Not only is there considerable flexi-

bility in time of appearance among individuals, but there is also
variation in respect to different content for the same individual
a phenomenon called "horizontal decalage."

-

A person may be at dif-

ferent levels of development for different subject areas, or may

show different levels of achievement in problems that involve the
same kinds of operations.
A related concept, "vertical decalage," can be understood if

we recall the process of reflective abstraction.

Because the student

is able to solve problems on the "plane of action" before he can do

so verbally,

and because his operations are logical before he can

formulate their logic, the child often understands the subject without understanding the "lesson."

(UI

:

14

and 96-104)

far from being an application of
Practical adaptation.
conceptual knowledge, constitutes, on the contrary, the
first stage of knowledge itself and the necessary condition
(PP:162)
of all subsequent reflexive knowledge.
.

.

That a person knows before he can demonstrate his knowledge is a

warning against too-hasty evaluations, and that he learns by doing
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reminds us of the importance of allowing
the student to pursue

internally motivated experiments.

The notion of active learning

does not necessarily imply a lot of motor
activity, but rather

engagement of the mind in performing an
operation on familiar but

problematic objects.

(PP:163)

By means of actual problem-solving,

involving operations on increasingly abstract
objects, we progress
in the construction of symbolic,

formal systems.

How the Development of Reason Can be Influenced

5.

to understand is to discover, or reconstruct by
rediscovery, and such conditions must be complied with if
in the future individuals are to be formed who are capable
of production and creativity and not simply repetition.
.

.

.

Jean Piaget

In the introduction,

chapter,

I

and again at the beginning of this

suggested that there have traditionally been two basic

methods of influencing behavior: training and instruction.
ly speaking,

General-

training is the more direct method, aimed at developing

skills and habits through practice.
a model

7

The teacher may simply serve as

for imitation, or he may deliberately intervene in the usual

trial-and-error process by reinforcing the desired performance,

helping to produce
ments.

l\Tien

a

certain association of thoughts and/or move-

the student is able and willing to carry out verbal

commands, instruction may be used as an adjunct to training, either
as a cue for immediate response or in the form of a general rule to
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be followed in response to specified
conditions.

Instruction need not take the form of
imperatives in order
to influence behavior.

A teacher can do so more effectively,
and

with more lasting results, by presenting
ideas which become incor-

porated into the belief system governing
the actions of the student.
In altering the content of thought,

instruction may not only influ-

ence overt behavior, but may sometimes also
stimulate the practice

of thinking.

Used in this way, the communication of ideas
can again

be seen as a training technique

the mind.

-

in this case for the training of

Ultimately, when used as a means of presenting ideas
to

be reflected upon by a practiced mind, instruction
contributes to

knowledge
The application of these methods to both learning and
development has already been discussed, especially in Section
chapter.

2

of this

Badly used, instruction does no more than clutter the mind

with the transient raw materials of knowledge.

Similarly, training,

when undertaken merely to elicit an automatic response, has little
significant effect.

Piaget rejects the associationist view of

learning

according to which knowledge.
results from
acquired habits without there being any internal activity
which would constitute intelligence as such to condition
those acquisitions.
(01:14)
.

.

.

.

.

Only when the student, through his own rational activity, organizes
his ideas in a stable, systematic way can we say that true learning
has occurred.

Both training and instruction, however, can be used

to supply the conditions under which the student will take the
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necessary initiative.

If the ideas that prompt a
conceptual reorga-

nization have been received by instruction,
or abstracted from be-

havior patterns developed through training,
then he has also been
taught

-

and not simply taught, but genuinely
educated.

IVhat

makes

the difference is not that any special
method has been used, but

that the same fundamental methods have been
used in a special way,

with an understanding of both the individual
child and the universal

way in which knowledge develops.
The schema on the following page seems to me a useful
way of

representing the relationships between ways of teaching
and the
elements of learning.

Here artificially separated, the activities

of thinking and doing must be integrated in order for learning to
take place.

IVliile

each may be influenced independently, the results

remain superficial unless they can be assimilated into existing

patterns of thought and behavior.
In terms of method,
is no

teaching logico-mathematical knowledge

different from teaching experimental knowledge.

In both cases,

the child needs the opportunity to stabilize his new learning by

using it in various ways and, at the proper time, to expand it by

meeting appropriate challenges.

At each stage, his existing level

of development must be respected, so that he is fully in control of
any change.

But while it is easy for a teacher to accept that cer-

tain concepts may not yet be present, it is more difficult to understand that some are there in different forms.

We cannot assume that

words have the same meaning for the child as they do for adults, or
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that ways of thinking which seem to us
naive, Incomplete, and even

contradictory are not coherent and satisfying
from his point of
view.

(PP

:

152-3, 164-5)

Clearly it is not enough to know one's subject.

The success

of peer teaching is due to the fact that other
students only slightly more advanced can still remember what it
was like not to have

grasped the lesson.

Furthermore, the young teacher profits from the

opportunity to consolidate his recent discoveries.

For the adult

teacher, it is more difficult.

though these views are much more widely accepted today
than heretofore, no great progress has been made in putting
them into practice, simply because the active methods are
much more difficult to employ than our current receptive
methods.
In the first place, they require a much more varied
and much more concentrated kind of work from the teacher.
Secondly.
without an adequate knowledge of child
psychology.
the teacher cannot properly understand the
students' spontaneous procedures, and therefore fails to take
advantage of reactions that appear to him quite insignificant
and a mere waste of time.
The best methods are also the
most difficult ones: it would be impossible to employ a Socratic method without having first acquired some of Socrates'
qualities, the first of which would have to be a certain respect for intelligence in the process of development. (PP:69)
.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

Even when the relevant pedagogic principles are understood, there is
still the matter of evaluating the status of each student.

For this,

traditional methods are inadequate.
The two basic faults of the examination are that generally it
does not give objective results, and it becomes, fatally, an
end in itself.
The school examination is not objective
mostly because it depends on memory more than on the
The surest
constructive capabilities of the student.
method of diagnosis and of prognosis is certainly that based
(L)I:74on the observation of students and their real work.
.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

77)

What is most significant here is not the answer to a problem, but
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“To the adult mind this room appears disorganized, but to
the mind of a child everything is logically arranged for use.”

Drawing by G. Emerson
Saturday Review/World

;

,

@ 1976
Inc.

8
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the way in which the student arrives at the answer he
gives.

The rewards for mastery of the "active methods" more than

compensate for the investment.

For one thing, there are not the

usual problems of maintaining interest, for while it is important
to remember that the child cares little about the answers to other

people's questions, and moreover has his own criterion of what

constitutes a "right" answer, he is vitally interested in his own
sense of equilibrium.

The smaller the child, the less likely he

is to be capable of "heteronomous activity" because of his still

undeveloped capacity for accomodation.

(PP:159)

However, when

an object is assimilable into his scheme, it is spontaneously

seized upon.
Interest is nothing other, in effect, than the dynamic
aspect of assimilation. As Dewey demonstrated with such
profundity, true interest appears when the self identifies
itself with ideas or objects, when it finds in them a means
of expression and they become a necessary form of fuel for
(PP:158-9)
its activity.

Interest is not inherent in any object, but in the use that can be

made of it.

Similarly, the "work" of accomodation is undertaken

willingly when new objects are introduced that bear on
seen as problematic by the child.

a

situation

Following the "moderate novelty"

principle, the teacher can sustain interest and growth in a way that
is

personal but not private.

IVhen

the form of affectivity properly

associated with any activity is present

-

i.e.

internal motivation

it is not necessary to manipulate the child by means of feelings

connected with external evaluations and the giving and withholding

-
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of rewards.

(SS:33-34)

Reinforcement of success which is
also

seen as personal is far more valuable
in promoting development
than
is

praise for conformity to standards
which are meaningless to the

Student
c

Attention to the present concerns of the
child is as important in determining the optimum rate of
change as it is in choosing

the content of the lesson.

From the fact that progress through

identifiable stages can be speeded up, it does
not follow that this
is desirable.

At each level, the child needs the opportunity
to

consolidate and use his new learning, until he himself
suspects its
inadequacy and eventually recognizes the need for restructuring.
while everything warns against artificially rushing,
and advises the dedicating of this beginning period, precious
to everyone, to the establishment of the most solid foundations possible.
the multiple activities that are necessary
seem to parents like a luxury and a waste of time,
simply delaying that solemn moment.
when the neophyte
will know how to read and count up to 20!
And so it goes at
each new stage.
(UI:82)
.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

The most important implication of Piaget's theory for educators is
not that development can be hurried, but that it can be completed.

Although autonomous intellectual progress is not always obvious, it is far more stable than results obtained by instruction

which provides answers without problems or by training which offers

practice without the opportunity for reflection.

The freedom of

activity essential to this method is not to be confused with selfindulgence.

Far from denying the concept of accountability, pro-

gressive education encourages the individual to understand its

meaning by learning first of all to be accountable to himself.
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Without such attention to building the
particular cognitive structure
which makes success meaningful, we deprive

tlie

child of power and

freedom along with objectivity and social
awareness.

By developing

reason to its fullest potential, the educator
most effectively
c

responds to humanistic concerns as well as to
the most rigorous

standards of intellectual excellence.
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CHAPTER

III

REASON IS NECESSARY FOR VIRTUE

lack of intellectual honesty may be
of a certain practical use (it IS usually more convenient
to be able to contradict oneself) and, when scruples about
truth finally
.

.

.

triumph

It IS certainly not because there has
been competition and
selection in terms of utility alone but rather

because of certain choices dictated by the internal
organization of thought.

Jean Piaget^

1.

Recognizing Virtue

Virtue, to the extent that it exists, makes its appearance
as
a property of persons.

Moral virtue, however, differs from the

usual collection of desirable character traits

-

tagged by Kohlberg

the "bag of virtues"

(ME:59-69)

rather than manner.

Terrible consequences can be brought about with

-

in that it depends upon motive

loyalty, steadfastness, efficiency, impartiality.

Although such

qualities are useful, and often necessary, in the service of moral
virtue, we should not be misled into thinking that virtue is consti-

tuted by them.
Ways of behaving, moreover, can be variously interpreted: stub-

bornness may be mistaken for persistence, heedlessness for courage,
flattery for consideration.

Moral virtue, on the other hand, should

be objectively identifiable, irrespective of personality.
is possible,

it

is

If this

because one set of criteria for such judgment

to be found, not in the peculiarities of the person, but in those

is
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of his individual actions.

judged independently

^

Each action can be isolated, as
it were

-

event, then reattributed to an agent,
whose

moral worth in each instance rests
partly upon that of his action.
A good person is one who actually
succeeds in doing the right thing.
His moral virtue is derived, not from
the style in which he performs
a right action,

but from the fact that he performs it.

There are two kinds of judgments to be made in
order to determine

whether an instance of right action has occurred.

One concerns the

moral value of the event in question: does it conform
to a universal

standard of right?

Would an impartial, omniscient observer, aware

of all its consequences, choose to have it happen again?

The other

has to do with its status as an action: can this kind of event
be

attributed in this way to the person instrumental in bringing it
about?

The answer depends upon his reasons for acting at all, and

here we may have to rely to some extent on the agent's willingness
and ability to make them explicit.
ly; while not

But we need not do so exclusive-

immediately apparent, it can be argued that intentions,

as much as physical events,

can be identified by any thoughtful

observer.

Because we must depend upon empirical judgments in both cases,
we cannot be certain of either the moral worth of an actual event or
the presence of a corresponding good intention.

Yet both kinds of

decisions can be made objectively, using criteria which can be
shared.

In order to do so we need to form not only a theory of

action, but also a theory of right action that is universally
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acceptable.

Contrary to what we might expect, this can be
accom-

plished; where differences occur, their source is
not in any funda-

mental disagreement about the kinds of results we
consider desirable,
but rather about the reasons why they are desirable.

develops, however, we more nearly approach

a

As reason

common principle by

which to judge whether our common values are being realized.

If

mature practical reason were universally employed, actions
believed
to conform to that standard would be universally recognized as

tight and those which violate it as wrong.

Our remaining differences

would then be due either to our failure to have reasoned at all in
a given instance,

or more likely to the inaccessibility of the

relevant information.

2.

Right Action

.all maxims are repudiated which cannot accord with the
will's own enactment of universal law. The will is therefore not merely subject to the law, but is so subject that
it must be considered as also making the law for itself and
precisely on this account as first of all subject to the law
(of which it can regard itself as the author).
.

.

T

Immanuel Kant

We can probably agree that in order to be right an action must
at least have good results.

It

is not enough that it be done from

kindness, or the desire to produce good; it must really benefit
someone.

But no action falls outside this classification, since

all are events deliberately brought about, presumably for the purpose
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of advancing someone's interest.

If it should turn out
that not

all the effects of an action
meet our expectations,

the mere fact

that It occurs always has at least
the immediate benefit of fulfilling some intention.

What is more interesting is that we
produce good consequences
at a price, paid always by ourselves,

well.

and frequently by others as

This need not mean that the necessary
means are disagreeable,

but only that they demand an investment
of time and effort, replacing other possible good-producing actions.

Thus every actuality we

bring about contains some balance of the
desirable and the undesirable.

One must be weighed against the other.

is right when it proves successful:

pect, and no regrettable ones.

The action selected

it has the good results we ex-

We have judged correctly that this

new situation is at least as beneficial as any alternative
we

might have chosen.
Prudential rules, the results of

a

sort of cost-benefit analysis

help guide us in our choices among competing benefits insofar as we
seek to maintain or promote our particular welfare.

As skill, oppor

tunity, and imagination increase, we tend to develop a system of

preferences involving a hierarchical arrangement of aims, varying in
duration and intensity, and interconnected by causal relationships.
This spares us from making calculations and choices at every turn,
and from losing valuable opportunities.

IVhen two

actions are found

to be incompatible, we are usually prepared to sacrifice one for the

other.

But prudential norms are always subject to revision in
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response to the contingencies of experience.

It

is our primary,

ongoing task to maintain a realistic system
of purposes, organized
in such a way that we do not undermine
our own interests either by

contradicting ourselves or by making plans based
upon expectations
that cannot be realized.
Not the least part of keeping both an internal
balance and a

stable relationship to the environment is learning
to anticipate the

actions of other agents.

Because each pursues his welfare in his

own way, and furthermore may change his methods, it is
difficult for
us either to influence others or to accomodate our
actions to theirs.
But to what extent ought we to do either?

Here virtue, as much as

powerlessness or ignorance, constrains us in our choice of action.
We take account of the sometimes conflicting interests of others,

not in order to avoid incurring their opposition, or to discover how

they can be manipulated, but in recognition of their right to exper-

ience good results.

Although consideration for the wishes of others may impose further limitations on the range of right actions available to us, the

institution of rules of consideration can also be recognized as a

benefit worth the sacrifice.

We recognize our interdependency, and

make a personal investment in seeing justice perpetuated.

Miile we

may not adopt these rules only or even primarily out of self-interest,

they are nevertheless always seen by us as compatible with our ultimate interest.

Virtue is not the antithesis of prudence, but simply

its generalization.

Prudence forbids us to harm ourselves; morality
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forbids us (and others) to harm anyone
(including us).

Prudentially

right actions produce particular benefits
chosen as preferable to

others under a certain set of conditions,
thus contributing to the
internal harmony of individual systems.

Morally right actions are

beneficial under any conditions in that they
maintain a stable'social

environment in which such choices can best be
made and carried out.
There is no single time at which a clear,
universal criterion

of justice becomes apparent.

The notion cannot even begin to occur

to us until we have formed a realistic concept
of self as distinct

from other.

By reasoning about our experience, we must first
develop

what Piaget calls "the scheme of the permanent object."

Then, at

first, other persons are seen merely as objects, and
valued to the

extent that they are considered instrumental to us.

On the other

hand, even inanimate objects may be invested with subjectivity.

own preferences are falsely attributed to others

inappropriately spent.

,

Our

and our sympathies

The concept of personhood, like any concept,

is only gradually elaborated as we take note of experienced similar-

ities and differences.

We make attempts at identification, test

reality, and, ideally, adjust our ideas accordingly until we can

understand that we are similar to all others in some respects and to
certain others in certain respects, and that in some ways each of us
is unique.

The general assumption with which we begin is that we ourselves, and then those with whom we identify as like ourselves, de-

serve fair treatment.

The good is whatever value is perceived as
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held in common.

Hence, to the extent that we
identify with only

limited groups, we make different
assumptions not only about which

individuals qualify for consideration but
about what constitutes it.
As we are physically able to expand
our associations, however, and
at the same time become intellectually
able to accomodate greater

diversity, the group extends to include all
possible people, known
or unknown.

At the same time, our idea of what is
right for every-

body in our group is narrowed and refined.

IVhen

we ourselves finally

come to value rational choice, we can understand
that this is the

only value we can validly attribute to any person,
as well as the
only good that can, in practice, be "distributed"
equitably.

The

opportunity to choose freely is one that can be claimed by every
person by virtue of his personhood, even though the ability to
make
wise use of this opportunity may be present only in potential form.
The universal principle which affirms the freedom of each

person to take responsibility for his own course of conduct

-

"max-

imum liberty compatible with the like liberty of others" (CD:673)
imposes no particular rules or values.

-

Rather, it allows each of us

to adopt for ourselves any consistent set of values we choose, and

then demands that we act accordingly.

It

seems to me that this is

the one standard of conduct to which we can all be legitimately held,

whether or not we have explicitly formulated or committed ourselves
to it

The implication of this principle is that no action ought to

interfere with any person's effort to maintain the difficult
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prudential balance we have described.

This prohibition includes

the act of legislating to others without
their consent, for there
is no kind of action which may not
under certain circumstances be

harmful to someone, and none which is always
beneficial.

Just

cto

the extent that a choice made by an
individual limits the choices

of others can we intervene without his consent
to limit his action.
This is in no way to suggest that everyone
should be able to
do whatever he desires, but only that he
should not be compelled,

except by his own choice, to do something other than what
he desires.

namely

The power everyone claims for himself whenever he acts
that of doing only as he wills

,

is also his right.

-

-

It

should be possible, at least, for him to deliberate, to legislate
to himself,

and to follow his own conviction that the action he

performs is more desirable than any he forgoes.

The rule can be

stated as simply as "let live," provided we understand "live" as

including

".

.

.

in a way that is considered worthwhile by the

person in question."

(Some would go so far as to extend this

"right" to all natural phenomena.

I

think the decision might well

be Justified by prudence, along with a certain respect

based on fear or admiration

-

-

whether

for the integrity even of inanimate

systems, but that the moral "right" must be limited to considera-

tion for the dignity of thinking beings.)
I

do not mean that virtue requires, or even allows, a passive,

laissez-faire attitude.

For one thing,

I

am constantly obliged to

safeguard, by exercising it, my own right to take responsibility
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for the conduct of my life

-

remembering that

I

myself am to be

counted as a representative of human dignity,
and that self-

effacing submission, though sometimes more
convenient than protest,
serves nothing but oppression.

At the same time,

I

must avoid
c

infringing upon the dignity of others, either by doing
them outright harm or by "helping" them without their prior
consent.

Neither does the moral law exempt me from carrying out any
substantive obligations.
to keep any

1

Although it dictates none, it requires me

have voluntarily made.

The greater part of allowing

others to live and plan freely is not in leaving them alone, but in
letting them count on the kinds of behavior they have come to expect of us, or at least due warning to prepare for change.
1

need not cooperate with others,

I

Although

will probably choose to do so

by means of both personal and social contracts.

Wien

I

have some

purpose in common with others, we agree upon certain codes of conduct believed to be conducive to that purpose and consistent with

our respective interests.

Now we are both morally obligated to be-

have in particular ways, not because there is necessarily any inherent good in such behavior, but because we have promised.

In the

future, my private goals must be chosen in such a way that they are

consistent, not only with each other, but with my publicly expressed
intentions.

Tliese go

beyond my explicit commitments,

include the expectations

I

I

think, to

lead people to have of me through my

behavior.

Foremost among our rules will be those for the keeping of
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promises

-

Should

decide that a different course of
action is better for me

I

i.e.

for acting as though our
intentions were unchanged.

and wish to be released from a
commitment,
or else good cause why

must give fair notice,

could not do so, and be prepared
to pay

1

whatever penalty might be agreed upon as
for non-compliance.

I

a

reasonable compensation

If everyone is clear about his
particular in-

terest and the available means, then different
arrangements can

usually be made which are no worse for those
who were counting on
something from me, and no worse according to
their judgment.
such agreement can be reached, then

I

If no

remain morally bound by my

original promise, however regrettable, and what might
have been a

pleasure now must be done only for the sake of duty.
idiere are times, however, when

not because

I

must break certain promises

I

-

am physically prevented from carrying them out, and

certainly not because it is inconvenient or even a hardship for me
to do so, but because

that
I

I

I

find that

have made a pact with the devil

was deceived, not simply about my preferences, but about what

was really conceding.

not continue to intend as
duty.

I

I

In the light of new evidence,
I

thought

I

I

simply can-

would, even for the sake of

now have reason to believe that to carry out my original

agreement, regardless of the prudential value of doing so, would

cause gratuitous harm to someone.
law as the only one by which

I

If

I

am committed to the moral

am categorically bound, then

I

am

compelled by reason to consider myself released from performing the
action to which

I

now see that

I

have wrongly obligated myself.

I

-
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am in fact forbidden to perform that
action, no matter what punishment there may be for my failure.

The one assumption

I

am free to

make, with or without the concurrence
of my collaborators, is that

obedience to the moral law has precedence
over more limited forms
c

of justice.
Since

1

myself am one person whose will

agreement

I

have made, then in acting to protect my moral
integrity

by breaking that agreement
interest.
I

I

I

is

being violated by an

am simultaneously advancing my personal

may appear to be acting only for that reason,
just as

may appear to be doing in keeping a commitment
for the sake of

duty.

Nevertheless,

I

have no choice.

To carry out action A, upon

which we have agreed, without being able to intend A would
be to
extinguish myself as an agent.

To continue to intend not-A without

being able to carry it out is more than

of doing.

I

am psychologically capable

If it is not impossible for us to intend not to intend,

we certainly cannot do so more than once, and in any case it is more

than can be expected of us.

IVhile there

may be times for having

absolute faith in the judgment of others, we would have no way of
deciding in whom to place such trust if we ourselves never judged
To surrender this freedom would be to reject our moral re-

at all.

sponsibility.
When it is necessary to make a decision of this kind unilaterally,

I

think we may be excused from the usual procedure of giving

fair notice if it must be done at an unfair cost to ourselves.
we do so,

it

IVhen

is often because we are compelled by the value we place
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on our integrity and reputation; to
misrepresent ourselves by appearing to condone something we do not would
be an intolerable deceit.

Beyond this, we may go out of our way to make
our situation

a

public

example, in order to help others avoid suffering
a similar injustice.
When it seems clear that no one will be convinced,
however,

I

doubt

that we are required to martyr ourselves for such
a purpose.

Keeping promises is one specific kind of action usually
agreed
upon as a means of maintaining an equitable social balance.
it is

Since

likely that every action will make a difference to persons

other than ourselves, hence that none is to be undertaken without

consideration of their choice in the matter, such social contracts

provide the most direct means of assuring their consent.

Normally

we ask permission before performing actions of probable consequence
to others, and when we neglect to do so they are expected to speak
up.

Yet we cannot always consult those affected by our actions, or

even know who they are.

Because of temporal limitations, or because

a person for whose welfare we are legitimately responsible is clearly

unable to know what is good for him, we are sometimes forced to

estimate what someone would choose to have done for him, or would
consent to have us do for ourselves, if he shared our beliefs about
our circumstances and his own.

For this reason we tend to rely on

the normative rules developed over time, and in this way prudential

judgments enter into moral ones.

We must take considerable care,

however, not to confuse one with the other, or to follow blindly,
on our own behalf or another's, any temporal rule which might

69

interfere with individual freedom.

In the last analysis, we our-

selves have to accept this freedom, and
the corresponding obligation
to justify our choices of action.

We are often mistaken about the kinds of
results others want,
c

and almost as often about what

^

want

.

We make wrong judgments as

to who is capable of deciding what is truly
in his own interest.

Such mistakes can sometimes be corrected, if we
take seriously the

expressed opinions of those affected, or of those
in a better position to speak for them.

Unfortunately, not all of our decisions can

be corrected or vindicated by the judgment of others
or even by the

evidence of time.

Even if everyone could agree not only upon a

principle of justice, but about the kinds of actions that would be
consistent with that principle in every case, we would still be unable to carry out our good intentions with full confidence that what
we are in fact doing is the kind of thing we know we must.
a

To judge

contemplated change, most of whose ramifications are not apparent

and some of which may never be,

in order to decide whether we should

be willing to call this change our action, we must rely on beliefs

based on incomplete evidence.

Even when an action has been performed

we cannot claim that it is right.

We can, however, claim that to

the best of our knowledge it is not wrong.

To support and expand

this knowledge, we can educate each other about our experiences, and

then use our reason.
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Good Intentions

3.

Freedom.
is not the absence of causation.
Negatively
freedom is the absence of, or independence
from, foreign or
external determination.
Positively, freedom is autonomy,
or self-determination.
c
.

.

Robert Paul Wolff^

If,

as we have claimed, moral judgments about
persons depend

partly upon the good or bad consequences of their actions,
then on
this account alone we are always prevented from knowing
that some-

one has acted virtuously
a

-

not because we do not know that he caused

particular event, or even his reasons for doing so, but because we

cannot know all the consequences of any event.
In addition,

in order to decide whether someone has acted

virtuously, we must decide whether the event in question can really
be called his action.

For even if we knew that a person's behavior

were just in every way, this would not be enough to make him worthy
of praise.

Virtue can be confirmed only if the desirable result

not only caused but intended.

I\0ien

is

that is the case, then the per-

son who so intends is responsible not merely as an instrument but as
an initiator, or agent.

The event can be called his action, and

judged right or wrong according to the given standard.
is no such thing as

Even if there

'free will,' and we are never more than instru-

ments, the fact that we consent to be instrumental in bringing about

foreseeable events, or in failing to cause or prevent them when that
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seems to be in our power, makes us
as responsible as if we were

entirely free to choose what would occur.
Because it is so apparent that
responsibility depends upon

what we ^ejieve we are doing, it is not
difficult to think of the
(.

’acts of will' that bring about voluntary
movements as our real

actions, and all that follows as something
beyond our control once
we have unleashed the cause.

^

But it is the actual consequences of

our movements that affect others, and to the
extent that they can
be predicted by us, they can also be considered
"ours."
reason, and because it is closer to familiar usage,

term "action" to refer to physical behavior

behavior of

a

I

For this

have used the

but only to physical

-

certain kind: that for which there is a corresponding

intention.
I

shall try to clarify what

I

mean by both "action" and

"intention," and then consider different cases in which a person
appears to be morally right or wrong, and whether in each kind of

situation he deserves praise or blame.

I

think we will find that

it is not possible to perform a wrong action

thing knowingly

-

-

i.e.

to do the wrong

but only to perform an action with bad consequen-

ces, and furthermore that when this occurs it can always be traced
to ignorance.

The question of assigning blame then turns on the

issue of whether we can be blamed for our ignorance, and my own

opinion is that education is always a more appropriate and useful
response.

(Learning does not preclude punishment, and remorse for

having failed to learn sooner may in fact constitute it.)

Similarly,
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moral praise is due when an action not only
conforms to the moral

standard, but when it is done because the agent
believes it conforms
(if not necessarily for only that reason).

Again, since virtue

really is its own reward, praise is superfluous,
though not unwelcome.
By civil law,

a

person is not held responsible for the things

he does without the ability to know what he is doing

-

provided

either he has no control over this ability, or else it was
reasonable
for him to have given it up.

The presence of either of these condi-

tions, of course, is debatable, and is at the heart of many of our

perplexities regarding guilt and innocence.

But even on the assump-

tion that a person is conscious, of sound mind, etc., and furthermore
has admitted to having acted in such a way as to cause a given event,
it is still not clear to what extent he can be held responsible for

any of its effects and whether he deserves the prescribed rewards or

penalties for them

.

The knowledge that he is in such a state as to

be able to act in some way is no assurance that he is able to act in
the right way.

Even when he understands and accepts the right rule,

he may be unable to make the relevant connections between his action
as it is conceived by him and the way in which the very same behavior

could be conceived.

Because of the limitations of our particular

experience, it frequently happens that we act without ful

knowledge

of what we are doing.
The greater part of knowing what we are doing is in under-

standing the causal chain of events associated with some movement we
choose to make, for that movement can be referred to by many
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descriptions, according to its causes and
consequences.^

Under

certain descriptions, it can be called an
action; under others,

merely behavior.

In answering the phone,

am also leaving my

I

dinner, causing the ringing to stop, letting
you know that

home (as

I

promised

I

am

I

would be), making a fingerprint on the re-

ceiver, preventing you from catching cold by
going out in a storm
to find me,

on the cat

learning that
-

I

have won the sweepstakes, and stepping

and countless other things, only some of which

aware, and only some of which

I

meant to do.

I

am

Although only one of

these descriptions may apply to my uppermost purpose in making

certain movements, it seems to me that any

I

foresaw, or could im-

mediately have acknowledged if questioned, can also be said to
describe an action of mine, but that those

I

failed to take into

account, whether they come as welcome or unwelcome surprises or

remain unnoticed, describe only causally related events for which
I

deserve neither credit nor blame.
Action, then, is a species of behavior, distinguished by the

fact that it was intended, or preconceived as worth doing, given
the right opportunity.

To intend a given action A, it seems to me,

is not only to conceive it as desirable

toward it^)

,

(or to have a "pro attitude"

but at least to choose it as more desirable than ‘the

alternative not-A.

In some minimal way,

an intentional action is

thus also deliberate, and there has been deliberation not only

about the technical possibility of carrying it out, but about its
value.

The kinds of intentions to which we are more or less
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committed, including the intention to
do what we believe is morally
right, make up the system of purposes
mentioned earlier, and are

kept in trust, so to speak, to be drawn
upon as the appropriate

occasions arise.
c.

IVlien

we act, we recognize both an intention,
or the idea of

an action judged as preferred, and
the idea of its immediate reali-

zation,

judged as possible.

If we have only one such intention
in

mind, and can think of the corresponding
action under only one de-

scription, then nothing more is required for execution
than this

awareness, and the simple act of reason by which we
relate intention
to opportunity.

Barring unforeseen intervention, and with only a

little skill, we are able to begin acting at a very early
age.
it is difficult to imagine such single-mindedness.

But

Very soon, we

have a number of intentions and learn that if we wish to avoid un-

expected consequences it is not enough to acknowledge opportunity.
We must also decide whether it is appropriate

our other intentions

-

-

i.e.

consistent with

to perform a given action at this opportunity.

The intention that is carried out must have been evaluated and con-

firmed as not only more desirable than not-A, for example, but as no
less desirable than any of our growing repertoire of intentions that

might have been acted upon instead.

As we begin to understand causal

connections, we learn to evaluate by whatever standard we hold each

of the foreseeable consequences of carrying out a given intention.
Until we have personally adopted a universal moral standard,

we must rely for our criteria of right action on the rules of those
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we respect.

Physical and social dependence lead us
to adopt, at

least temporarily, a "morality of obedience."
the formation of
to two conditions: (1)
from the outside, that
span (don't tell lies,

the sense of obligation is subject
the intervention of orders given
is, orders of indeterminate time
etc.); and (2) the acceptance of'
these orders, which presupposes the existence of
a sentiment
--A gsneris on the part of the person who receives the order
toward the person who gives it.
.

.

.

.

.

.

According to Bovet,^ this sentiment is one of respect and
consists of affection and fear.
Affection alone could not
suffice to produce obligation, and fear alone provokes
only a physical or self-interested submission, but respect
involves both affection and the fear associated with the
position of the inferior in relation to the superior, and
therefore suffices to determine the acceptance of orders
and consequently the sense of obligation.
(PC: 123)
To the extent possible, such "unilateral respect" is expressed in

imitation.
an 'ideal

Beyond this point, "the self of the parents.

self which

conscience."'

.

.

becomes

is a source of coercive models and of moral

(PC: 122-3)

One problem inherent in this stage of heteronomy

-

the fact

that "the power of the orders is initially dependent upon the physical presence of the person who gives them"

fication with the authority figure.

-

is

overcome by identi-

But this identification only

aggravates the more fundamental problem

of conforming to the ideal

-

-

that of the impossibility

and leads to dissociation of the .ele-

ments of respect, typically causing guilt, anxiety, etc.

(PC: 124-5)

Provided the child can overcome these ambivalences, he enters
the substage of moral realism

,

a

preoperatory structure "according

to which obligations and values are determined by the law or the
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order itself, independent of
intentions and relationships."
thority retains its concrete quality,
however.

Au-

An order from the

authority figure is taken very literally
and is considered binding
even when waived by that person.
(PC: 125-6)

Moral realism next leads to objective
responsibility

,

whereby

an act is evaluated in terms of
the degree to which
It conforms to the law rather than
with reference to whether
there is malicious intent to violate
.

.

.

(PC^lLr

the law or whether the
involuntary conflict with the law.

Under this criterion, for example,

... a lie appears to be serious not to the degree that it
corresponds to the intent to deceive, but to
the degree that
It differs materially from the objective
truth.
(PC:126)
Finally, the child begins to move into the stage
of moral

autonomy

.

IVhereas he used to regard rules as "sacred" and
"of

transcendent origin," he now comes to see them as "the result of
agreement among contemporaries" and subject to change by consensus.
This notion is dependent upon the development of mutual
to "unilateral") respect.

(as

opposed

A sense of reciprocity comes about as a

result of social cooperation, most particularly with one's peers,
and "is often acquired at the expense of the parents."

(PC: 127)

The

idea of mutual responsibility also appears to depend upon the forma-

tion of the concrete operatory structures.
As early as seven or eight and increasingly thereafter,
justice prevails over obedience itself and becomes a central
norm, equivalent in the affective realm to the norms of
coherence in the realm of the cognitive operations.
(Indeed,
on the level of cooperation and mutual respect tliere is a
striking parallelism between these operations and the struc-

turation of moral values.)

(PC: 127)
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It is at this point that a child can
begin to respect an

authority by virtue of his fairness, or the degree
to which he
represents the moral law, rather than simply because
of his personal

power to do direct good or harm.

Children who have reached the

level of concrete operations select "leaders” from
among their col-

leagues partially on the basis of such earned respect,
and not so
much, for example, on account of size, appearance, skill,
or the

opinions of others.

(PC: 128)

A person chosen as a moral authority

by reason of this more relevant criterion will be willingly emulated,
and if the judgment by which he was selected was correct, he will

enhance development by providing a realistic model.

If the judgment

was faulty, he can more easily be rejected than can a parent or other

"imposed" authority, and the rejection in itself constitutes another
step in moral development.
Even if there is no person who commands such respect, by virtue of either position or merit, we can at the very least form a

concept of right action in terms of our individual interests.

(One

suspects that in cases where we are dependent upon a strong but

conflicting will, we might do better to be without emotional attachments.)

By conforming to practical and political codes, if only for

the prudential value of doing so, we can come to appreciate (or mis-

trust) the general value of rules; we learn how to apply them and,

eventually, to make our own.

And although it is more difficult

under these conditions, we can probably develop the concept of equal
consideration in a purely intellectual way, whether or not we have
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ever met anyone who seems to deserve
this right.
The main point is this: only when
we have learned, in one

way or another, to trust and value
our
the universality of human agency.

^

Judgment can we recognize

And only then can we appreciate

the significance of the principle
which protects this universal good.

Until we are in this position, we cannot
be held responsible

either for failing to act for the sake of
the moral law or for

deliberately violating it, but only for performing
actions whose
consequences fail to conform to that law.

Such actions cannot be

judged morally wrong except by others, and cannot
be intended as

morally wrong actions.

We may, of course, break every kind of social

law quite deliberately, but our doing so is always
supported by some

quasi-moral justification we believe is sound.
to be influenced,

If our actions are

it cannot be done by appealing to a moral principle

we do not understand, and it cannot be done permanently by
political

sanctions.

Although we intend to do "the right thing," our interpre-

tation of what is the right thing is not entirely free of ambiguity.
Until we ourselves make the correct interpretation, we can hardly

avoid moral error.
IVhen Lt

.

Galley killed children who had not contracted to

fight, he could not have thought of them as responsible agents like

himself, since it is questionable whether he considered himself

responsible except to his commander.

He may have believed he was

doing a right thing in obeying the orders of a superior, even if
the action was not one he himself preferred.

IVhen

Lord Amherst sent
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smallpox-infested blankets to the Indians,
under no orders to do so
but his o.^, he may not have
considered himself bound by
obligation other than that of self-interest.

^

If on the other hand he

recognized the moral law, he could not
have considered his particular
cause exempt.
More likely, he mistakenly believed
that his enemy did
not fall under the same law, hence
did not deserve the same kind of

consideration he would have shown other
gentlemen "of his kind."

Although these seem to be clear instances
of morally wrong
behavior, it does not seem that they can be
called actions.

Lt.

Galley performed the action of carrying out
his duty to a legitimate
authority.

Lord Amherst performed the action of acquiring
territory,

as he was no doubt charged to do, by being
a clever tactician.

Nei-

ther kind of action can be called morally wrong
in itself, and

I

doubt that either was understood as a means of doing moral
harm.

Although each agent failed to evaluate his behavior and its consequences by a standard that supersedes any obligation to particular
individuals, each could call his action right if he believed morality

meant only conformity to the expectations of others.

While we may

feel contempt for people who behave in what we are able to see as

ignorant or treacherous ways, we cannot call them bad, but only

deficient in virtue.
As for those of us who are both rational and either experi-

enced or imaginative enough to understand the moral law, the wrong
we bring about is due to more particular kinds of ignorance.

We

make mistakes that harm others in the same way that we mistakenly
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harm ourselves, and having learned the
effects of our actions we
are as eager to avoid repeating them,
and to make amends if we can.
(This IS not to deny that at times,
perhaps because of an important

emotional investment or perhaps because of
ordinary cowardice, we
almost deliberately blind ourselves to
knowledge of effects that are

quite evident to others.

This need not be attributed to selfishness

or maliciousness, however; we do the same sort
of thing in breaking
rules of prudence.
to

In either case,

the ultimate effect of attempting

'bend” reality to our immediate needs is always
self-destructive.)

Whether

I

am acting specifically for the sake of moral duty,

or performing an action

I

believe to be both prudentially desirable

and morally obligatory, or simply doing what

that it is permissible in both respects,

I

I

want in the belief

can easily bring about a

wrong event without intending to do something that

is wrong.

be blamed for not having known better, but not for being evil.

though my pride is at stake, in that

I

I

may
Al-

have either miscalculated or

neglected to calculate at all, my moral education should be relatively simple in that it is only a matter of learning to exercise more

care, or perhaps more courage, rather than of grasping the principle

of autonomy.
When
I

I

act with an intention that is not only good as far as

can determine, but acceptable to others,

I

may still do them harm

either by failing to accomplish what

I

intend or by causing something

Because of my ineptness,

I

give you bad advice, harming

I

did not.

you as surely as if

I

had deliberately betrayed your confidence in
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me.

At great sacrifice to myself,

I

agree to give a meal to a

starving man and do so only to discover
that he is allergic to it.
I

promise my father that

will save the homestead and take
care of

I

him in his last years, but while

I

am away seeking my fortune he

suddenly falls sick and dies unattended, and
the property
at auction.

is sold

Tragedies great and small, caused by errors
of both

commission and omission, can be traced to unforeseen,
and often unforeseeable, circumstances.
those of the non-repentant

,

Such mistakes are easier to excuse than
and all the more so when they are done

with the consent and even gratitude of those being harmed.

Our for-

giveness seems to be proportional to the extent to which we ourselves consider the intended purpose worthwhile, and to which we

ourselves could not have predicted the results under the same conditions.

Yet the underlying reason for the wrong behavior is the

same in both kinds of cases; where there is no remorse, it is because

ordinary, empirical ignorance is compounded by ignorance of the
moral law.
We are morally blameworthy only if we knowingly do what is

morally wrong.

In order to do so, we would have to act autonomously

in deliberate violation of the principle of universal autonomy.

Unless we failed to count someone other than ourselves as an agent,
it does not appear we could do such a thing.

While it is not irra-

tional to make such an exclusion, provided we appeal only to logic.
it is nevertheless contrary to what logic tells us to conclude about

the evidence of our senses.

To act on such a false belief would not
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be to act knowingly.

Miether or not we ourselves are able
to recognize the correct
moral standard or make the correct
judgment about

a

particular

action. It can be definitely determined
that some of the results of

our actions are bad.

We, however, are never bad,

judged only by our actions.

For our actions are always intended,
and

It IS always our intention to do what
is right,

results.

If,

if we are to be so

in addition, we produce bad ones

i.e.
-

to produce good

either because of

faulty predictions about our chosen means, or because
we have not
yet formulated a principle that allows us to cause only
objectively

good results
If,

-

then we are not bad, but mistaken.

on the other hand, our actions do prove to be the correct

means of doing good (and no harm), we ourselves need not necessarily
be considered good on that account.

The good we cause may be acci-

dental; we make fortunate rather than unfortunate "mistakes.''
to deceive you, but

I

I

I

I

mean only to go about my business, but

teach you something that greatly improves your life.

deserve no credit unless

as my actions,

mean

am not clever enough; you take it as a joke,

and have a wonderful laugh.
in doing so

I

I

have intended these kinds of behavior

and furthermore have chosen them because

I

believed

them to be the means of doing only good.
The conditions of virtue are that

I

intend to do only good

succeed (in the estimation of any informed, rational

and that

I

judge).

In addition,

if

I

am to be credited with my success, then

not only my actions, but all their results, must be believed by me
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to be good, and

everything

I

I

must be correct in my belief.

do must be an action.

to the extent that

I

act,

While

I

In other words,

am unqualifiedly good

am not unqualifiedly good.

I

times fail to act responsibly

For

to take as full account as

-

some-

I

I

might
(.

of the probable consequences of my proposed action
in order to see
if they are consistent with my intention to do only
what is right,

and then either to incorporate these further results
as part of my

action or else revise my intention.

responsibility,

I

could not know

made a correct judgment.
I

If

I

-

Even if

I

were to take such

nor could anyone

-

that

I

had

can never be called bad, neither can

be called good with any certainty that it is true.
But the fact that it cannot be attained is not sufficient

reason to reject the ideal.

Although we can only approximate abso-

lute virtue, we can do so more nearly if we are both observant and

thoughtful.
selves

-

We must first be able to carry out instructions to our-

to understand and bring about the idea of an action.

But

it is not enough to follow the example of others, or even to promise

to act in specified ways.

We are free to act virtuously only when

we know how to promise ourselves to accept responsibility for all
the consequences of any intention we choose to realize.
In order to evaluate our intentions morally and instruct our-

selves accordingly, we must be able to predict the consequences of

our actions (or to recognize the right advice, which amounts to the
same thing).

It seems to me that this ability is a necessary condi-

tion not only for conforming to the moral law, or any law, either
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original or adopted, but for formulating the
correct moral principle.

Only when we

^

reason about possible as well as actual events,

basing our expectations on warranted evidence, are we
able to accept
the idea that it is up to us to do so.

Because we welcome such
c

prudential responsibility (once we are capable of assuming
it), we
want others to show their respect for our rational freedom by
following the same principles of consistency and objectivity.

But if

they are competent to do so, then they are agents like us, and there
is no way we can justify our failure to grant them the same privi-

lege.

It is not just because of any advantage to ourselves that we

reach this conclusion, although there

^

an advantage in reciprocity,

as well as in keeping our beliefs consistent with reality.

Virtue

is required by the same kind of reason with which we formulate our

other practical beliefs.
Reason, then, is necessary both in order to understand the

moral law and in order to carry it out.

The first needs to be

accomplished only once; the second requires continuous effort.
Since we are usually motivated to make this effort ourselves
are at least able to do so

-

-

or

once we have formulated the moral

principle on the basis of our own reasoning, the primary task of
the moral educator must be to help his students achieve a universal

standard of right action, partly by stimulating the general development of reason, and partly by encouraging students to reason about
moral questions.
In the next chapter

I

shall outline the levels of moral
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reasoning developed by Lawrence Kohlberg
and their relationship to
Piaget's stages of intellectual
achievement.
In conclusion, I
shall discuss the general kinds of
methods that can be used to

foster moral development.
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CHAPTER

IV

VIRTUE CAN BE TAUGHT

... in contrast to a given rule imposed upon the child
from outside, the rule of justice is an imminent
condition
of social relationships or a law governing their
equilibrium.
Jean Piaget^

1.

Levels of Moral Development

We have said that virtue depends on right action: doing the

right thing for the right reason.

Moral education which is concerned

only with behavior, however successful it might be in producing the

appearance of virtue, is unlikely to have significant or lasting results,

for behavior alone is not a true indicator of virtue.

Right

intentions, on the other hand, are very likely to be followed by
good results as well.

It

is

quite probable that someone who knows

how to set himself a practical standard will also know how to carry
out his purpose in a variety of circumstances, provided only he can
get access to the relevant facts.

Furthermore, since the standard is his own, it is presumed
that he will want to avoid any action that is known to contradict
it,

and will correct his mistakes as they become apparent to him.

Once a person has formed the intention of governing his conduct by
the moral law,

it can be expected with some confidence that most of

his actions will conform to that law, even though the specific means
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he will choose cannot be predicted.

The moral educator, therefore,

if he is to effect any such stable change in behavior, ought to

address himself to the fundamental task of forming right reason.
By "right reason"

I

do not mean simply correct reasoning, or

the ability to draw valid inferences.

Neither do

1

mean the general

intention to do whatever is right, or any specific intention based
on a concrete rule of behavior.

Each of these, however, is essen-

tial for the formulation of a sound argument which explains why a

particular action is the right one to choose in

a given situation.

Such an argument constitutes a "right reason."

In addition,

as the

foundation of his argument, the agent must have adopted the correct

principle of moral rightness by which to evaluate the rules to which
his actions, in turn, are judged to conform.

To understand this

ultimate, universally binding principle is to have "knowledge of the

Good."

Without such a criterion, the explanation "because it is

right" is as meaningless as "because

I

say so."

Only by reference

to a definite standard of rightness can one justify his particular

actions, hence act virtuously.
If we think of an argument for the rightness of an action as

consisting of three "stages,"

I

think it will be easier to isolate

the elements necessary for virtue and to understand both how "knowl-

edge of the Good" can be achieved and why such knowledge is sufficient,

if not for perfect virtue, at least as a worthwhile aim of

moral education.
typically
At the most immediate level of moral reasoning, one
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argues, it seems to me, in the
following way (where K names a kind

of action)
1.

:

In

circumstance C,

I

may do only acts which are

2.

This is circumstance C.

3.

This act which

4.

I

I

am considering is

may now do this act which

K.

am considering.

I

If class K happens to have only one member,

becomes obligatory, and "I may" becomes

K.

"I

then the act in question

must."

Otherwise, the

agent may choose any action he desires, provided it
meets the given
standard.

Using a similar kind of reasoning, one selects his actions
from a prudential point of view, using as his standard their
intrinsic desirability to him balanced against the probability that they

are effective means to his more highly valued goals.

A particular

action may be chosen from the' subset of approved actions formed by
the overlapping of those that meet each of the three criteria: de-

sirability, practicality, and morality.
In order to decide how to conform to all three standards at

once, one must be able to perform a rather complicated piece of

reasoning.

His more difficult task, however, is to determine whether

conditions C and

K

apply.

No matter how competent he may be as a

logician, he must always base this decision on an empirical judgment,
and such judgments are always a possible source of error.
A different sort of "knowledge" is required in order to de-

termine the "truth" of the first premise,

"I

may do only acts which
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are K."

In order to consider himself bound by
a rule for the right-

ness of actions, one must believe that it
conforms to his standard
for the rightness of rules.

The second stage of his argument is

more abstract (where R signifies "morally riglit")
If

I

2.

In

circumstance C, only acts which are

3.

If

I

1.

want to be virtuous,

want to be virtuous,

only acts which are

I

I

:

may do only acts which are

may,

K

are

R.

R.

in circumstance C, do

K.

The sort of reasoning by which we decide that acts of a certain kind
are right in a given circumstance can be carried out at a purely

theoretical level, independent of personal plans and attitudes or the

existence of circumstance

C.

Such a rule is still not binding until the condition "If
want to be virtuous" is removed.

I

However, since it is not necessary

to believe that the truth of this condition is ever in question,

am taking the position that it is not.

Although

I

I

doubt that anyone

has ever actually done so, it is as though each of us had argued in
the following way:

want to be virtuous,

1.

If

2.

I

want to be virtuous.

3.

I

may do only acts which are

I

I

may do only acts which are

R.

R.

It seems to me that we not only want to be virtuous, but believe that

we are.

Virtue is simply integrity in practical reasoning, and no one

would choose to think of himself as basing his actions on arguments
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that are unsound.

If we fail or hesitate to do
K in C, this can

just as easily be explained by the fact
that we question whether K
IS

really the only acceptable choice, or simply
that we have not

stopped to question.
m\en we do so, such questioning should cause
us to reevaluate

our concept of

R,

or the criterion by which we judge the moral

rightness of temporal laws.

Wiile we all probably agree that every-

one ought to do what is right or just, and even tend
to concur in

our values, hence on the general kinds of actions that
can be so

judged (e.g. truth-telling, respecting sentient life, obeying the
civil law, etc.), we may differ in our understanding of why such

actions should be considered right.

Reevaluation can lead us either

to formulate a more adequate explanation for our actions, one that

cannot so easily be given up, or else to renew and strengthen our

earlier convictions.
Piaget excludes this "knowledge of the Good" from his three

categories of knowledge, since "metaphysical and ideological" constructs
are not kinds of knowledge in the strict sense but forms
of wisdom or value coordinations, so that they represent.
cultural superstructures rather than any extension of biological adaptation.
(BK:268, footnote)
.

.

.

.

.

Nevertheless, practical wisdom has in common with experimental

knowledge certain structural features which reflect the development
of logico-mathematical knowledge.

As is true in the area of science,

each more advanced stage represents a better psychological

librium

-

equi-

"better" in that it is more comprehensive and more highly
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differentiated.

(AP: 1068-69)

Each new integration is accepted,

not because it is demonstrably true, but
because it is useful in

organizing thought and more adequate in explaining
apparent ambiguities.

It is

achieved through a form of reasoning which is at

least analogous to scientific insight and appears
to differ from
it only in that the subject

matter being reorganized consists of

facts about what people generally acknowledge as valuable,
or be-

leive ought to be true, rather than facts about what is believed
to be actually true or probable or possible.

The notion that there is ultimately one correct criterion of

moral rightness is consistent with the research findings of Lawrence
Kohlberg.

It

is his theory that there are three definite levels of

moral maturity, each divisible into at least two substages, through

which everyone moves in an invariant sequence of development.

These

six stages are outlined on the following pages (94-96) in a table

synthesized from two sources (AP: 1066-68 and ME: 71- 72).

The fact

that the stages are found to be culturally universal also supports
the idea that everyone believes himself bound by some standard of

rightness.

Although not everyone is at the same level of judgment

at a given age or in a given culture, and few ever progress to the

most advanced stages, everyone who is "concrete operational"

virtually every normal person over age

8

-

-

i.e.

can give some kind of

moral justification for his actions.

The six stages of moral development are defined, not in terms

of the extent to which people follow moral rules at all, or according
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LEVELS AND STAGES OF MORAL JUDGMENT

LEVEL
I

BASIS OF MORAL JUDGMENT

STAGE

Egoistic interest in
concrete events.

1

•

Obedience and Punishment

.

(.

Moral value resides in
external, quasi-physical happenings (bad
acts) or in quasiphysical needs, judged
in terms of immediate
personal interest.

Trouble-avoiding set; objective
responsibility. Unquestioning,
egocentric deference to superior
power or prestige, motivated by
fear rather than respect.
The
physical consequences of action
regardless of their human meaning or value determine its goodness or badness
2

.

Instrumental Relativism

.

Naively egoistic orientation, with
awareness of relativism of value
to each actor's needs and perspective.
Right action is that which
is instrumental in satisfying one's
own needs and occasionally those
of others.
Naive egalitarianism
and orientation to exchange and
reciprocity.
Elements of fairness
and equal sharing are present, but
they are always interpreted in a
physical, pragmatic way. Human
relations are viewed in terms like
those of the market place: favors
for rewards.
Reciprocity is a
matter of "you scratch my back and
I'll scratch yours," not of loyalty,
gratitude, or justice.
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LEVELS AND STAGES OF MORAL
JUDGMENT

Good-boy-good-girl orientation.
Good behavior is that which
pleases or helps others, and is
approved by them. One seeks
approval by being "nice." Conformity to stereotypical images
of what is majority or "natural"
behavior, and to the expectations
of peer groups.
Behavior is often
judged by intention; "he means
well" becomes important for the
first time and is overused.
4.

Law and Order.

Orientation toward authority and
fixed rules.
Right behavior consists of doing one's duty, showing
respect for authority, and maintaining the social order for its
own sake.
What the law commands
takes precedence over personal
wishes, good intentions, and conformity to group stereotypes.
Regard for the earned expectations
of others, and for earning respect
by performing dutifully.

Ill

Responsibility under
universal principles

5

.

Social Contract

.

.

Moral value resides in
conformity to shared
or shareable standards,
rights or duties.

Contractual orientation, generally
with legalistic overtones. Clear
awareness of the relativism of
personal values and opinions, and
a corresponding emphasis on procedural rules.
Recognition of an
arbitrary element or starting point
in rules or expectations for the
sake of agreement, and of the possibility of changing laws in terms
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LEVELS AND STAGES OF MORAL
JUDGMENT

LEVEL
III

BASIS OF MORAL JUDGMENT

STAGE

Responsibility under
universal principles

5-

Social Contract

(continued)

.

of rational considerations of
social utility.
General avoidance
of violation of the will or rights
of others and the welfare of the
majority.
Duty is defined in terms
of standards which have been critically examined and agreed upon by
the whole society.
Outside the
legal realm, free agreement and
contract are the binding elements
of obligation.
(This is the
"official morality" of the U.S.
government, but is achieved by only
about one American adult in five.)
In Stage 5b there is an orientation
to decisions of conscience, but

without clear rational principles.
6

•

Principle and Conscience
Autonomy

;

.

Orientation not only to actually
ordained social rules, but to universal principles of choice appealing to logical comprehensiveness
and consistency.
These standards
are not concrete moral precepts,
but ethical principles of justice,
dignity, and equality of human
rights.
Orientation to conscience
as the directing agent and to mutual
respect and trust. The moral test
of a Stage 6 decision is the agent's
willingness to apply his principles
as readily to himself as to others.
(Socrates, Gandhi, and Martin Luther
King, Jr. are given as examples.)

97

to the content of the rules
they do follow (i.e, the
meaning of K)
but by the structure of the
reasons they give for adopting
certain
common rules or maxims.
(CD:671)
Using twelve basic moral concepts
Kohlberg finds that all people
tend to reach the same conclusion
on
a particular issue

-

for example, that human life
ought to be Valued,

or that one ought to obey moral
rules.

The reasons they give for

these conclusions, however, or for
choosing among conflicting values,

reflect an increasingly general logical
structure corresponding to

definite levels of cognitive development.

For example, on the issue

of "Conscience, Motive Given for Rule
Obedience or Moral Action,"
the six stages are represented by the
following kinds of motives:
(AP:1068)
1.

Obey rules to avoid punishment.

2.

Conform to obtain rewards, have favors returned,
and so on

3.

Conform to avoid disapproval, dislike by others.

4.

Conform to avoid censure by legitimate authorities and
resultant guilt.

5A.

Conform to maintain the respect of the impartial spectator
judging in terms of community welfare.

SB.

Conform to avoid self-condemnation.

The motive for moral action by a Stage-6 individual is not given, but
I

take it to be "Conform to avoid inconsistency between thought and

action, as is binding on every agent."
IVhile such

principles dictate no concrete categorical rule of

action, they can be used categorically as a standard for choosing

among possible actions under various real conditions.

Because they
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are so used by people who
tend to share certain
universal values,
the legitimacy of the rules
designed to protect these
values is also
universally recognized.
The adequacy of the
principle being used
as a rationale for the
rules, however, will be
questioned by anyone
at a more advanced level of
moral reasoning.
Because he is abl'e to

understand the less adequate
principle as well, he "knows"
that he
IS "right."
However, he has no common ground
for communicating his
reasons

-

e.g.

for convincing a conventional-level
conformist, who

has not yet come to trust individual
freedom guided by reason, that
his later stage is really more
advanced, and not a state of degeneracy.

(CD:672)

Since it is on the basis of such
principles that we

choose one kind of right action as
"higher" than another and give it

precedence in

a

case of moral conflict, it appears that
differences

among individuals, groups, and nations can
be resolved, not by teaching the "right" values, but by teaching
better reasons for holding

the values we share.

2.

How the Development of Virtue Can Be Influenced

In reality, education constitutes an indissoluble
whole, and
it is not possible to create independent personalities
in

the
ethical area if the individual is also subjected to intellectual constraint.
If he is intellectually passive, he
will not know how to be free ethically.
Conversely, if his
ethics consist exclusively in submission to adult authority,
and if the only social exchanges that make up the life of the
class are those that bind each student individually to a
master holding all power, he will not know how to be intellectually active.
.

.

.

Jean Piaget

2
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Kohlberg's longitudinal studies strongly
suggest not only
that there is a hierarchical sequence
of stages in moral development, such that achieving any given stage
depends on having com-

pleted all previous stages in sequence, but
that the ability to
progress from one stage to another is directly
related to one's
level of logico-mathematical development.

In one study,

for ex-

ample, whereas 60 percent of the subjects had
attained formal

operational thinking, only 10 percent showed clear
principled thinking

(Level III).

operational."

Of this 10 percent, however, all were "formal

The conclusion drawn is that "attainment of the

logical stage is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the

attainment of the moral stage."

(AP:1071)

The following table (page 100) shows that there is a "point-

to-point" correspondence between logical and moral development.
(AP:1072)

It seems quite clear that a major part of teaching virtue

consists in teaching reason: providing opportunities which challenge
students to reach for more highly integrated levels of thought by
means of "reflective abstraction" from the levels at which they are

already operating.

With only a superficial acquaintance with the

stages identified by Kohlberg, it is not difficult to see that each

depends upon a previously learned logical skill or concept, while

elaborating and going beyond it.
First,

in order to carry out any rule at all,

one must be

capable of the simple reasoning necessary to classify an immanent
action as of a given kind, hence to act intentionally.

One would
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RELATIONS BETWEEN PIAGET LOGICAL STAGES
AND KOHLBERG MORAL STAGES
All relations are that attainment
of the logical
stages is necessary, but not sufficient,
for
attainment of the moral stage.

LOGICAL STAGE
FORMAL OPERATIONS

Substage

3

:

MORAL STAGE

POSTCONVENTIONAL MORALITY

True formal thought.

Construction of all possible
combinations of relations,
systematic isolation of
variables, and deductive
hypo thesis- testing.

Stage 6
Universal ethical
principle orientation.
:

Stage 5B
Higher law and
conscience orientation.
:

Stage 5A
Social contract,
utilitarian law-making
perspective.
:

FORMAL OPERATIONS

CONVENTIONAL MORALITY

Substage 2
ordering triads of
propositions or relations.

Stage 4
Maintenance of social
order, fixed rules,
authority

:

Substage 1
relations involving
the inverse of the reciprocal.

:

:

Stage 5
Orientation to interpersonal relations of
mutuality.
:

CONCRETE OPERATIONS

PRECONVENTIONAL MORALITY

Substage 2
thought

Stage 2
Instrumental hedonism
and concrete reciprocity.

:

reversible concrete

:

Substage 1
categorical classification.

Stage 1
Punishment-obedience
orientation.

Prelogical thought sensorimotor
intelligence; symbolic,
intuitive thought.

Stage 0
The good is what
want and like,

:

:

:

:

I
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expect that the first standard
a child learns to use
in selecting
his actions is that of immediate
desirability. Next, in order
to

forego such an action, he must
be able to understand causal
rela-

tionships in general, and to see his
immediate desire as incompatible
with the means to other more strongly
desired events (e.g. avoiding
punishment, or winning the approval of
others).

Having learned something about planning,
the child is in a

better position to value order as

a

condition of freedom, and to

choose to follow the given moral or civil
law for the sake of main-

taining such order.

Since he can now conceive of whole systems,
he

is able to "conserve" values as well
as physical properties.

The

conditions of operational thought (i.e. objectivity,
non-contradiction) are also seen as social obligations,
necessary for the equi-

table balancing of points of view.

The notion of justice begins to

shift from retribution to distribution and from
obedience to reci-

procity.

Having "decentered" enough to see himself as a separate
object with a distinct perspective, the child begins to think of

himself as both initiator and collaborator.

These complementary

roles are closely related to the appearance of reflective thought.

These two aspects of the behavior that starts at around seven
years (individual concentration and effective collaboration)
are, in fact, so intimately linked that one is hard put
to say whether the child has become capable of a certain
degree of reflection because he has learned to cooperate with
others or vice versa. (SS;39)
.

.

.

At first, the child works out elaborate systems of rules with his

peers, with whom he feels a great sense of solidarity.

At the same
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t«e
"play

he maintains respect for
adult authority outside
his domain of
.

still within the conventional
level, there is considerable
room for cognitive growth
before this way of thinking
can be seen
as inadequate.
For example, the ability
to carry out a rule
like

"Never disobey legitimate
authority" requires more
intellectual

sophistication than is needed to
follow one like "Never disobey
your
parents," and this in turn is more
difficult than a rule like "Never
run into the street."

Only after considerable experience
and prac-

tice does one learn to grasp the
increasingly complex concepts of
action that fall within conventional
morality and to calculate how
to make his actions conform to
those concepts.

Finally,

m

order to move from the conventional
to the "post-

conventional, reflective, or philosophic
view of values and society"
(AP:1072), one must have freed his
thinking from its ties to the

given physical world.
The shift in adolescence from concrete to
formal operations,
the ability now to see the given as only a
subset of the
possible and to spin out the alternatives, constitutes
the
necessary precondition for the transition from
conventional
to principled moral reasoning.
(AP:1072)

Although the six universal stages of moral development are

neither innate nor inevitable (AP:1058), most people in most
cultures
achieve concrete operational logic and a conventional level of

morality whether or not they receive formal schooling.

Only about

half of adult Americans, however, reach formal operational thinking,
and of these far fewer become morally autonomous.

Having achieved
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the cognitive level that corresponds to
a given moral stage, one

cannot automatically move "across" the
chart to that stage unless
he has also progressed "up" the moral ladder
through each pre-

requisite form of moral reasoning.
What is being asserted, then, is not that
moral judgment
stages are cognitive - they are not the mere
application of
logic to moral problems - but that the existence
of moral
stages implies that normal development has a
basic cognitivestructural component,
While formal operations may be
necessary for principled morality, one may be a
theoretical
physicist and yet not make moral judgments at the principled
level.
(AP:1071)
.

.

,

One can only speculate as to why moral progress does not keep

pace with cognitive growth.

Surely the former is more strongly in-

fluenced by affective experiences and habits and the degree of trust

established between the individual and his society.

It

may be that

some additional factor such as "will power" or "ego strength" makes
the difference.

For example,

in a study on cheating Kohlberg and

Krebs found that among the conventional-level subjects who cheated
(55% of all conventional subjects), only 26% had been classified as

"strong-willed," while
(CD:672)

a

definite majority (74%) were "weak-willed."

But it is still not clear that a factor of "will" can be

distinctly separated from the factor of knowledge.

On the contrary,

it seems to me that strength of will is directly proportional to

strength of conviction.
consistent reasoning.

Both together may result from strong and
On the other hand, the will may be dispersed

among vague, contradictory, and loosely-held ideas, or it may be

enlisted inappropriately to sustain

a false but

compelling belief,

such as the reasonableness of a command made by an authority/security
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figure.
IVhen

the "will" becomes associated with a
false idea (i.e.

when one has a strong interest in holding
that idea), it sometimes
takes great moral courage for us to
acknowledge even the simple facts

needed in order to begin to use our reason.

In the light of certain

expectations in which we have an emotional
investment, we would find
this acknowledgement not just inconvenient, but
painful.

Standing

behind our failure to act on a principle we would
otherwise accept
as right is our inability to recognize a given
situation as falling

under that principle.

Our lack of right resolve can be traced, not

to an inherent weakness in our character, but to the
strength with

which we cling to a false hope or belief adopted under earlier, different conditions when either the facts were not available or we

were not sufficiently rational to see them.

Although we may "know"

intellectually what is the right thing to do, we are blinded to the
reality of the situation.
There is an objectivity of fact - not a perfect objectivity
of knowledge - on which ethics must be built, or rot away.
It does not justify intolerance, but neither does it justify
relativism or a moral education that teaches relativism or
implies it.^
A significant part of the empirical knowledge required for the

practice of virtue is self-knowledge, including not only clarification of our ideas about what we want, but also of our knowledge about
what we are really doing.

As a form of knowledge,

it is dependent on

both logico-mathematical development and on the relevant forms of

experience
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^e

two correlative aspects of the personality
are independence and reciprocity.
The person is an individual
who situates his ego in its true perspective
in relation to
the ego of others.
He inserts it into a system of reciprocity which implies simultaneously an independent
discipline
and a basic de-centering of his own activity.
The two basic
problems of ethical education are, therefore, to
assure this
de-centering and to build this discipline.
(UI:111-12)
.

,

.

^

Intellectual discipline, as it applies to one's place in a
reciprocal
social system,

autonomy.

is

inseparable from the achievement of psychological

One must "de-center," not only in the area of physical

knowledge about the common environment, but correspondingly in his

understanding of how he as an individual fits into that environment.
He must be able to free himself, not only from physical dependence,
but from the powerful injunctions and attributions of his early pro-

tectors, and he must confirm or replace these with independent judg-

ments based on his own observations.

If obedience has required too

much repression of personal desires, this process may involve getting
back "in touch" with one's feelings and accepting them as part of
reality.

IVhat

results is different from Stage

0

morality, however,

since "feeling good" is now only one of several criteria applied to
choices of action, and furthermore one is by now able to "feel" cog-

nitive dissonance.

IVhen

feelings and thoughts can be freely acknowl-

edged, and the personality reintegrated in a more authentic way, one

learns that he can choose, without external sanctions, not to act on

every desire and opinion.
In addition to personal psychological barriers,

there are

likely to be strong social constraints against breaking with tradition, whereas we are given every inducement to submit to the
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conventional wisdom.

Though it means giving up our
preoccupation

with our immediate concerns, we
learn quite easily to accept
the

prudential value to ourselves of making
the shift from assimilation
to social accomodation.

authority is only

a

Even the typical adolescent thwarting
of

different way of affirming that it
exists, 'and

often one simply transfers his loyalty
from one person or set of
Ideas to another.

Beyond the satisfaction of group
Identification,

if we have been treated with reasonable
fairness we can also recog-

nize the moral value of the law and the
legitimacy of other interests
To be critical of the laws of one's group, and
to do so with

reason, is not only difficult in an intellectual
sense, but may

require considerable personal courage as well.
Stage

5

The transition to

morality, although it is based on an awareness of the concept

of relativism and not simply on its practice, is virtually
indis-

tinguishable from Stage

2,

Indeed,

it is a sort of abstract replay

of the movement from strict heteronomy to instrumental relativism
(the stage Piaget calls "autonomous").

This iconoclasm is often seen

as a considerable threat by those who do not understand that the

revived subjectivity characteristic of this period, which may appear
as selfishness and lawlessness, really indicates the beginning of a

new and enlightened sense of individual responsibility.
Stage

3

To the

thinker, who cannot understand a way of thinking so far

beyond his own, the young person appears to be at Stage

2.

It

is

interesting that each has reason to think of the other as less mature
than himself.
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In the face

of these pressures for
conformity, both from the
people who are important to us
and from our

social institutions, few

of us form the habit of addressing
ourselves to moral issues unless
forced to do so by a critical
situation.
Kohlberg has found, however.

that progress can be made by
exposing a student to a situation

of moral conflict "for which his
principles have no ready solution,"
and then to discussions about
this situation with other students
who
are at the next higher level and
whose arguments are then supported
and clarified by the teacher.
(ME:
82)

children and adolescents rank as
reasoning they can comprehllT Children comprehend all lower
hend.
stages than their own
and often comprehend the stage one
higher than their own and
occasionally two stages higher, though they
cannot actively
express these higher stages of thought.
If they comprehend
the stage one higher than their own, they
tend to prefer it
to their own.
While it may be felt as dangerous, the
moral leadership of the Platonic philosopher-ruler
is nonethe less naturally felt. ...
The child's preference for
the next level of thought shows that it is
greeted as already
f^iliar, that it is felt to be a more adequate expression
of that already within, of that latent in the
child's own
thought.
If the child were responding to fine words and
external prestige he would not pick the next stage continuous
with his own, but something else.
(ME:80)
.

.

.

Movement out of the conventional stage is probably hindered by
the
fact that there are fewer opportunities to engage in such
discussion

and to hear such clarification, and fewer personal crises which re-

quire us to deal with moral issues at this level.
The transition to Level III usually begins, if at all, in
late adolescence, and it is eventually resolved, in early adulthood,
at a more highly principled moral stage.

(AP: 1072-81)

If achieved,

this new stage represents a more satisfactory balancing of personal
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and social concerns which enables
the young person to see himself
as both powerful and responsible,
more fully in control of his life.

We may take some encouragement in
Kohlberg's finding that "a larger

proportion of youths (are) at the
principled level today than was
the case in their fathers' day."
are at the preconventional level.

At the same time, however, more

The current weakening of conven-

tional morality, interpreted by some as a
sign of moral decay, can

indeed lead to "fixation at the preconventional
level."

Yet the

same situation represents an opportunity
for the development of

principled thinking.

"Given this state, moral and civic education

in the schools becomes a more urgent task."

(CD:674-5)

While moral growth depends on no specific knowledge
or ex-

perience, an experience of a certain kind may be needed as
the

motivation for resolving a certain kind of dilemma.

Both moral and

intellectual growth appear to depend largely if not exclusively upon
the opportunity to respond to appropriate moral and intellectual

challenges by restructuring one's values or knowledge.

The word

"appropriate" is most significant, since it is as much a mistake to
assume that an individual is capable of solving a problem well beyond
his level of development as it is to assume that he can never do so.

aristocratic tracking system.
rested on the assumption
that the capacity for abstract thought is all or none, that
it appears at a fixed age, and that it is hereditarily limited
to an elite group in the population.
However, when
democratic secondary education ignored the existence of the
adolescent cognitive shift and individual differences in their
attainment, real difficulties emerged.
Clearly the new
curricula assumed formal-operational thought, rather than
(AP:1082)
attempting to develop it.
Tlie

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.
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Kohlberg advocates instead
"progressive" education, where
development takes precedence over
achievement and is stimulated by
"pro-

viding opportunities for active
thought and active organization
of
experience."
(AP:1083)
He recommends to us the philosophy
of Dewey
the work of supplying the
conditions
which will enable the psychical
whiS'win'LaM^rh*^
functions, as they successively arise, to mature and pass
into higher functions in
the freest and fullest manner, 4

An important implication of this
philosophy is that the learning atmosphere must be immediately
meaningful to the student.

Often

this means taking advantage of
opportunities as they present them-

selves, even if doing so is disruptive of
the planned routine.

Dewey,

Piaget, and Kohlberg would all endorse the
following view:
Moral education is education for citizenship,
for mature life,
and is exactly like vocational education in that
it will be
useful exactly to the degree that it faces real-life
problems and that means controversy.^

"Intellect" should not be opposed to "life."

(AP:1083)

If such a

separation tends to occur in the realm of experimental knowledge,
there is an even stronger tendency to contrast the moral with
the

practical, rather than seeing morality simply as

a

more comprehensive

form of practical reasoning which considers the relationship of any

action to the possible prudential interests of any person.

Although movement to higher moral levels increasingly takes
account of a wider and more varied universe of individuals, one need
not give up valuing himself or the groups with which he is closely

associated.

On the contrary, he accepts each new principle because

he sees it as a more adequate reason for the equitable treatment of

no
himself and his broadening circle of peers.

Pluralism need not be

seen as an argument for relativism; rather, appreciation
of diverse

points of view can lead us to formulate more comprehensive,
objective moral principles.

In this connection,

Kohlberg has found that

one of the conditions favorable to moral growth is the
opportunity
for role-taking, or a norm which encourages the child to take
the

point of view of others.

(CD:676)

Similarly, moral growth is affected in a positive way by the

extent to which the institution takes the point of view of the child.
The second dimension of social atmosphere, more strictly
moral, is the level of justice of the environment or institution.
This structure may exist or be perceived at
any of our moral stages.
(CD:676)
.

.

.

Kohlberg postulates that "a higher level of institutional justice
is a condition for individual development of a higher sense of jus-

tice.”

(CD:676)

It seems quite clear that a

participatory demo-

cracy provides the best opportunity both for role-taking and for

making thoughtful choices, the results of which are heard.
Although we cannot always approve or allow certain kinds of
behavior, it is essential to show respect for the reasons a child
gives for his actions or for his desire to act in a certain way.
We often find that the reasons are not so much wrong as they are

only partially right.

Without some opportunity to express, if not

act upon, his own principles when they fall short of convention, the

child cannot be expected to do so when they go beyond it.
In the same way that a kind of contradiction exists in

adhering to an intellectual truth from outside (without
having rediscovered and reverified it) so it can be asked

Ill

**Thank you for coming. The talks were forthright and
useful, and frennded an excellent climate in which to
resolve our remaining differerscesT

Drawing by B. Tobey
1976
The Mew Yorker Magazine, Tnc.
;
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whether there does not exist some moral inconstancy in
recognizing a duty without having come to it by an independent method.
(UI;118)
Does (not) the right of ethical education, as in the formation of the mind, mean a right truly to construct or at
least to participate in the elaboration of the discipline
that will obligate those very same persons who collaborated
in this elaboration?
(UI:51)

Maintaining the ideal atmosphere in which to consider moral
or intellectual dilemmas is clearly the more difficult requirement.
Not every institution administers just rules in a just way.
In the logic of the system the student's intellectual and
moral activity remains heteronomous because it is inseparable
from a continual constraint exercised by the teacher, even
though that constraint may remain unperceived by the student
(PP:151)
or be accepted by him of his own free will.

Moreover, parents and others are eager to see evidence of progress
in the form of behavior, not in reasons for behavior; the fact of

inner growth is seldom immediately apparent.
The difficulty of implementing these recommendations, however,
is not

in question;

the only legitimate question is whether or not

they work to bring about intellectual growth.

Until such methods

have been more fully studied and tried, there is no reason to believe they do not work, and considerable evidence that they do.

Furthermore, there is some reason to suppose that "knowledge

of the Good" or practical wisdom, if it can be achieved, insures

virtue insofar as virtue is ever achievable.

The person who is

reasonsufficiently rational to understand Stage-6 morality is also
that bears
able enough to be able to obtain the kind of knowledge
is available to
upon his principles, and the strength of his reason
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induce him to use that ability to take an
objective view of reality.

Since both the principles and the knowledge
are his own, we can
expect him to carry out the kinds of actions
dictated by them.

Since both are right, to the extent that
either can be known by him
to be right, we can expect that most of his
actions will be right

also
IVhile we

may not be able to give convincing support for
the

sufficiency of reason, we cannot deny its necessity.
Since moral reasoning clearly is reasoning, advanced moral
reasoning depends upon advanced logical reasoning; a
person's logical stage puts a certain ceiling on the moral
stage he can attain.
(CD:671)

Kohlberg gives three reasons for advocating the cognitive-developmental approach to moral education.
is

First, although moral judgment

only one factor in moral behavior, it is "the single most import-

ant factor yet discovered in moral behavior."

Second, it is the

"only distinctively moral factor," and accounts for the crucial difference in behavior when other factors, such as "ego strength," are
constant
To illustrate, we noted that the Krebs study indicated that

"strong-willed" conventional stage subjects resisted cheating
more than "weak-willed" subjects.
For those at a preconventional level of moral reasoning, however, "will" had an opposite effect.
"Strong-willed" Stages 1 and 2 subjects cheated
more, not less, than "weak-willed" subjects, i.e., they had
the "courage of their (amoral) convictions" that it was worthwhile to cheat.
"Will," then, is an important factor in moral
behavior, but it is not distinctively moral; it becomes moral
only when informed by mature moral judgment.
Third, Kohlberg reminds us of a point we have already discussed

-

fact that growth in moral judgment is irreversible, whereas moral

the
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behavior alone is "largely situational and
reversible or 'loseable'
in new situations."

(CD;672)

Regardless of these practical considerations having
to do
with the actual effect of reason on behavior, we must
be reminded

of our theory.

If we accept the claim that virtue depends on
right

action, and action on knowledge, and knowledge on reason,
then there
is no

question as to the moral value of teaching reason.
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CHAPTER

V

CONCLUSION

Only a fool would despair of human nature because of his
failure to find a truly dutiful act.
Such a man might be
compared to a mathematician who, setting out to test his*idea of infinite length, seizes upon each long line he
encounters, follows it with rising hopes, and then in an
access of disappointment at always coming to the end, gives
up the notion of infinity itself as a bad bet.
For all we
know, the right acts we observe may also be morally worthy
acts.

.

.

.

Robert Paul Wolff^

I

have taken the position that virtue depends on both behav-

ior and thought.

We are virtuous only if we do the morally right

thing, and only if we do so with full knowledge of what we are doing

and of the reason why it is the right choice.

Together, these two

kinds of knowledge may or may not be sufficient to cause right action.

They are in any case necessary.

Reason and experience may or may not

be sufficient for achieving the required knowledge.

Again, both are

necessary.
I

have discounted other possible variables, most notably the

factor of "will power" as something distinct from the energy and

often courage it takes to acknowledge practical truths and make them
intelligible.
(i.e.,

Since one of the factors necessary for knowledge

experience) can never be fully controlled, it cannot be demon-

strated, when wrong behavior occurs, that some such additional con-

dition is still to be met.

Rather than trying to resolve an
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irresolvable issue,

I

think it is important for the teacher of vir-

tue to consider how the conditions that are clearly
necessary and
to a great extent within our control can best be fulfilled,
and to

act on the provisional belief that knowledge, if it were
achieved,

would be sufficient for virtue.
Of the two kinds of knowledge necessary for right action,
one is universally limited because of its temporal nature.

deliberately have

-

or have deliberately provided

-

We can

some, but not

all, of the experiences required for empirical knowledge of the full

consequences of our actions.

The probability that our practical

beliefs are true increases, however, the more we are able to support
our predictions with reasoned observations.

observations, at least, can be taught.

The habit of making such

Given the opportunity and

incentive to practice doing so, we increase our skill in noticing
things and in organizing our ideas about the things we notice.

Each

skill reinforces the other; experimental and logico-mathematical

knowledge develop interdependently

.

Indirectly, by being taught to

observe and to reflect, we can be taught to learn, to the greatest
extent practicable in each instance, just what we are doing, and

what we want to be doing, and whether or not they are the same.
The second kind of knowledge is universally achievable, at
least in theory, and very likely in practice.

If we cannot know

what we are doing, we can know what we ideally ought to be doing.

Whether or not we are willing to let the concept of theoretical
knowledge include not only knowledge about what

is given, but also
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"knowledge" of what is desirable, both kinds of "knowledge"
have in
common their dependence on the achievement of
level of thought.

Given

a

a

certain structural

sufficiently advanced form of logic, it

is possible for a teacher to provide the kinds of experiences
that

enable a student not only to grasp the laws of science, but to integrate his values and others' into a similarly complete, operational
system, governed by a constant, universal moral principle.

Fundamental to both the theoretical and empirical knowledge

required for virtue
tional" level.

is

the ability to reason at a "formal opera-

With this ability and the experience of attempting

to resolve certain kinds of moral problems in the most reasonable

way, we can achieve "knowledge of the Good."

With this ability, and,

in addition, the experience that bears on our particular choices of

action, we are in a position to implement our moral theory and to

bring about good results knowingly.
Formal reason is not likely to develop without deliberate

guidance.

While an individual may occasionally achieve this level

of logic independently, and while there is no guarantee that with
such guidance he will achieve it at all, there is a great and still

largely untried opportunity to influence cognitive development in a

positive way.

Again, it is a question of providing experience with

certain kinds of intellectual tasks.

Beyond this, it appears that

one needs only the universal disposition to maintain integrity and

equilibrium in order to reach a mature level of reasoning.
Reason, if not the only condition necessary for virtue, is
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clearly the crucial condition.

Experiences of a certain kind, and

of a kind that can be provided, are in turn crucial for
the development of both cognitive and moral reasoning.

We must think of moral

education, like every other kind of education, as not so much a

matter of furnishing final answers as one of providing skills and
opportunities for investigating problems.

To the extent that it

depends upon skill and practice in moral reasoning, virtue can be
taught.

The teacher who helps each student profit from the kinds

of experiences appropriate to his particular level of intellectual
and moral growth, and to take personal responsibility for his decisions, is the one who most significantly advances both the knowledge

and the practice of virtue.
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